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This thesis contributes to the real options and industrial organization research by study-
ing how volume flexibility influences firm’s investment decision under uncertainty in both
monopoly and duopoly setting. More specifically, it investigates how the firm’s ability to
adjust the production output according to demand fluctuations affects the firm’s decision
to enter the market. Volume flexibility enables the firms to produce within the constraint
of installed production capacities as such to adapt to market demand uncertainty. This mo-
tivates the study about the influence of volume flexibility on investment behavior, not only
in a monopoly setting, but also in a oligopolistic framework, where the incumbent firm
invest strategically to deter or accommodate the entrant firm. Furthermore, this thesis also
contributes to the welfare analysis of policy instruments. Due to the decentralization of
public resources, private firms are allowed to invest in these resources. These firms’ invest-
ment decisions are driven by profit maximization rather than social welfare maximization
when resources are centralized. Profit maximizing decision generates externality in a not
fully competitive market and leads to market failure. Thus, policy instrument is needed
to align investment decisions of a profit maximizing firm and the welfare maximizing so-
cial planner. In uncertain economic environment, the firm with the investment opportunity
is holding an “option". To capture this characteristic, the real option approach is applied
to study the investment decisions under demand uncertainty, with volume flexibility and
subsidy support being introduced separately.
The real options approach considers the firm’s investment opportunity as real options.
Due to the uncertainty in economic setting, the firm can postpone the investment and wait
for more information about the future uncertainty. Once the firm invests, the firm exercises
or kills the option to wait for new information. The basic real options approach is explained
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Early real options literature studies the decision of investment
timing for a given capacity size. However, when the firm makes investment decisions, it is
not only the timing that is important but also the size of the investment. By investing with
a large capacity, the firm takes a risk in case of uncertain demand. On the one hand, the
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
revenue may be too low to defray the investment costs if ex post demand turns out to be
too low. On the other hand, a large capacity yields a high revenue if the realized demand
is high. Dangl (1999) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999) are among the first to include the
decision of optimal investment capacity. The standard result is that the uncertainty makes
the firm invest later and more. This is because a larger uncertainty makes it optimal to wait
for further information and delay the investment for high demand ranges.
There are strategic capacity interactions between firms when making investment deci-
sions. It is well known that a firm can gain a first mover advantage by committing to an
action ahead of its rivals, see Várdy (2004). The first investor can deter an entrant through
preemptive investment in plant and equipment. According to Lieberman and Montgomery
(1988), the investment capacity of first mover serves as a commitment to maintain a high
level of production output, which is a price cut threat to decrease entrant’s profit. The
first mover successfully deters the entrant in these models of Spence (1977), Dixit (1980),
Gilbert and Harris (1981) and Curtis and Ware (1987). Tirole (1988) discusses the in-
cumbent’s capacity choices to deter, accommodate, and block the entry of an entrant in
Stackelberg model with fixed entry costs. To further analyze the investment decisions for
both timing and capacity in strategic interactions, the real options framework is used and
extended to the duopoly setting. Huisman and Kort (2015) analyze the deterrence and ac-
commodation strategies of the first investor where both firms can invest to enter the market.
Overinvestment by the first investor not only decreases the investment size of the second
investor, but also delays entry of its competitor to prolong the monopoly privilege. Hu-
berts et al. (2015a) show that entry deterrence can also be achieved by the incumbent’s
early investment timing rather than overinvestment when the incumbent is already oper-
ating in the market. This is because the incumbent firm invests earlier and in a smaller
amount compared to the situation without potential entry. Lavrutich et al. (2016) extend
the duopoly model by considering the hidden competition of a third firm and find that due
to hidden competition the follower is more eager to invest. So entry deterrence strategy is
more costly for the leader. A more detailed comparison and description of the monopoly
and duopoly models with capacity decisions can be found in Huberts et al. (2015b).
There are several extensions to the problem of investment under uncertainty using real
options approach. One extension is to introduce volume flexibility. A real life example
of volume flexibility is the automobile industry, where manufacturers can produce multi-
ple types of cars on a single assembly line with the Flexible Manufacturing System, see
Boonman (2014). When the market demand for one type of cars drops, the manufacturer
can modify the assemble line to decrease the output of the less popular cars and increase
the production of the more popular cars. Operations management literature studies the in-
vestment of volume flexibility with discrete time models, e.g., see Van Mieghem and Dada
(1999), Goyal and Netessine (2007), Anupindi and Jiang (2008), Goyal and Netessine
(2011). However, they cannot analyze the optimal investment timing from a continuous
time perspective. Hagspiel et al. (2016) fill the gap by taking the real options approach
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and analyze a monopoly firm’s investment decisions of timing and capacity under volume
flexibility. This is similar to Dangl (1999), but Hagspiel et al. (2016) considers also the
situation that market demand can be so large that the firm produces up to capacity right
after investment.
Some literatures introduce policy instruments to motivate earlier investment from a real
options perspective. One common instrument is to use price regulation such as the price
cap to regulate the delayed investment under uncertainty. According to McDonald and
Siegel (1986), an unregulated monopolist delays investment when there is demand uncer-
tainty. This is because the firm cannot appropriate all benefits, but does incur all costs.
So the monopolist tends to delay investment longer. If a regulator wants to correct this
only by the price cap, Dobbs (2004) thinks the first-best outcome cannot be reached as one
instrument is used for two goals: optimal investment ex-ante and optimal post-investment
pricing. Building on Dobbs (2004), Evans and Guthrie (2012) introduce scale economics
for capacity expansion where grouping investments across time is cost efficient, and show
the price cap should be lowered. Willems and Zwart (2017) assume constant returns to
scale in capacity expansion where it is not optimal to group investments. By assuming that
the monopolist has private information on investment costs, Willems and Zwart (2017) find
that the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a revenue tax that increases with the
level of the price cap. For lumpy investment and cost information asymmetry, Broer and
Zwart (2013) show that price cap should decrease as a function of the monopolist’s chosen
investment timing.
Market prices are generally influenced by the output quantity. For some industries, the
regulator cares not only about the investment timing, but also the size of investment. So the
policy instrument that regulates investment size is also used in practice. For instance, in
agriculture and energy industry, investments are often subsidized by the government. The
purpose of investment subsidies is to encourage private firms’ investments to achieve some
social objectives, like to increase the green energy consumption. The European Commis-
sion has set a binding target of 20% energy consumption from renewable sources by 2020
and at least 27% by 2030. However, an electricity producer might hesitate to invest in
renewable technology due to high investment costs compared to the fossil fuels. So the en-
ergy market has less incentive to deliver the desired level of renewable consumption, which
implies that support schemes should be provided to boost the investment activities in the
renewable energy sector. Such support schemes take different forms such as R&D support,
investment support1, feed-in tariffs2, quota3, and green certificate4 etc. A significant body
1Investment subsidies are to help overcome the barrier of a high initial investment. Investment subsidies
are usually implemented by means of the fiscal system such as rebates on general energy taxes, lower VAT
rates, tax exemption for green funds, etc.
2A regulatory, minimum guaranteed price per unit of produced electricity to be paid to the producer.
3A regulatory framework within which the market has to produce, sell or distribute a certain amount of
energy from renewable sources.
4A tradable commodity proving that certain electricity is generated using renewable energy sources. Pur-
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
of real options literature focuses on the subsidized investment decisions under demand or
policy uncertainty, see Pawlina and Kort (2005), Boomsma et al. (2012), Boomsma and
Linnerud (2015), Adkins and Paxson (2015), and Chronopoulos et al. (2016). The com-
mon conclusions of these contributions are that subsidy support provides incentives for
earlier investment. Furthermore, the opportunity to retract subsidy support in the future
accelerates investment, whereas the possibility to introduce subsidy support in the future
delays investment. Most of these literatures take the investment size as given and analyze
the firm’s decision on investment timing. The objective of the firms is to achieve profit
maximization, which is different from the social welfare objective. This results in differ-
ences between investment decisions of a profit maximizer and a welfare maximizer, see
Huisman and Kort (2015). The void of literature in optimal policy to align investment tim-
ing and investment size of market players with different objectives, i.e. a profit maximizer
and a social welfare maximizer, is also an inspiration of this thesis.
This thesis addresses the above mentioned economic problems and analyzes the optimal
investment decisions about timing and capacity for investment under uncertainty. There
are three main chapters, where the lumpy investment under uncertainty is considered as
continuous-time optimal stopping problem and analyzed from the real options perspective.
In the continuation region the firm waits with investing and holds an option to invest, and
in the stopping region it is optimal for firm to invest immediately.
Chapter 2 studies the investment timing and capacity decisions of a monopoly firm,
where the firm has volume flexibility and can adjust the output level within the constraint
of invested capacity. Hagspiel et al. (2016) analyze a market with unbounded size, whereas
this chapter considers a market that is bounded. More specifically, compared with Hagspiel
et al. (2016), this chapter considers a different demand function, which leads to different
results. For instance, Hagspiel et al. (2016) conclude that the utilization rate, the propor-
tion of capacity that is used for production right after investment, decreases with market
uncertainty. Whereas this chapter shows that with a bounded market size, the utilization
rate increases with market uncertainty in a fast growing market. The reason is that for a fast
growing market that is bounded, the optimal investment capacity is already at high levels
when the uncertainty is low. The increase in uncertainty does not significantly increase the
optimal capacity, but delays the optimal investment timing a lot. Thus, the market demand
is high when the firm invests, and a larger proportion of capacity is used for production.
In addition, it shows that in a fast growing market the firm produces below capacity right
after investment. If the market is slowly growing or shrinking, firm produces up to capacity
right after investment. In the intermediate case, the firm produces up to capacity right after
investment when uncertainty is low and below capacity when uncertainty is high.
Chapter 3 considers strategic capacity investment in a duopoly setting, where the first in-
vestor, the leader, always produces up to full capacity; and the second investor, the follower,
chasing a green certificate equals to purchasing a claim that the certificate owner consumes energy from the
renewable portion of the whole energy in the electricity grid.
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can choose volume flexibility, i.e., it can adjust output levels according to market demand.
This chapter focuses on the influence of volume flexibility on the strategic interactions be-
tween firms. Thus, on one hand it extends Chapter 2 by introducing competition into the
investment problems with volume flexibility. On the other hand, it is a generalization of
Huisman and Kort (2015), where both firms always have to produce up to capacity. The
results show that volume flexibility yields higher value for the follower. Compared with
the situation of a nonflexible competitor, the leader has more incentive to accommodate
rather than to deter the entry of its competitor. The reason is that the leader also benefits
from its competitor’s flexibility. More specifically, follower’s volume flexibility affects the
market price such that it does not fluctuate greatly and this is beneficial for both players.
Moreover, the leader has a higher value compared with the follower. This implies that the
leader’s first mover advantage is not overcome by the follower’s technological advantage
in flexibility.
Chapter 4 investigates the optimal subsidy policy that aligns investment timing and ca-
pacity of a firm (profit maximizer) and social planner (welfare maximizer). Compared to
the literatures on regulation, this chapter considers not only to regulate the investment tim-
ing, but also the investment size. Besides, the regulation literatures assume that the demand
structure is non-linear and the monopolist invests later than the social planner. Apart from
non-linear demand structure, this chapter also studies a linear demand structure and shows
that the monopolist invests at the same time as the social planner. Furthermore, price sub-
sidies and reimbursed investment cost are considered under linear and non-linear demand
structures. The analytical results show that subsidy makes the firm invest earlier than with-
out subsidy, which is consistent with the literature. However, under linear demand, the
subsidy implemented from the beginning cannot align the firm’s and social planner’s in-
vestment decisions. This is because the monopoly firm invests less than the social optimal
capacity. We show that there exists a conditional subsidy that aligns investment decisions.
The conditional subsidy requires to introduce subsidy when the socially optimal investment
is triggered. Then with the appropriate subsidy rates, the monopoly firm can be motivated
to invest with the socially optimal capacity size. Under non-linear demand, it is possible to
align the decisions by either implementing the investment subsidy from the beginning, or
introducing the subsidy at the socially optimal investment timing. When the two decisions
are aligned, the subsidy maximizes social welfare.

CHAPTER 2
Volume Flexibility and Capacity Investment
This chapter considers the investment decision of a firm where it has to decide about the
timing and capacity. On the one hand, we obtain that in a fast growing market, the firm pro-
duces below capacity right after investment. The utilization rate (the proportion of capacity
that is used for production right after the investment) increases with market uncertainty for
a very big market trend, and shows no monotonicity for a moderately large market trend.
On the other hand we get that, for a slowly growing or shrinking market, the firm produces
up to capacity right after investment. In the intermediate case, the firm produces up to ca-
pacity right after investment when uncertainty is low and below capacity when uncertainty
is high. The utilization rate in this case decreases with the market uncertainty. This chapter
is based on Wen et al. (2017).
2.1 Introduction
When entering a market, it is not only the timing that is important, but also the size of the
production capacity with which the firm enters. By investing in a large capacity, the firm
faces large investment cost, but can generate a high revenue in periods of high demand on
the one hand. On the other hand, if a firm is dedicated to producing at full capacity, it may
face a decline in revenues in case of a low demand realization. In this model we allow for
volume flexibility. It is defined as the firm can operate profitably at different output levels
according to Sethi and Sethi (1990). This enables the firm to produce less when demand
is low, and keep part of the invested capacity idle. In this way, volume production reduces
the downside risk that a firm takes.
Most of the literatures that study investment decision from real options perspective focus
on the optimal investment timing, taking the size of the investment as given (see Dixit and
Pindyck (1994); Trigeorgis (1996) for an overview). In this chapter, we determine not
only the optimal timing but also the optimal capacity size. Several contributions show that
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if a monopolist is allowed to choose the size of its investment, it invests later with larger
capacity for higher market uncertainty (see Manne (1961); Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999)). In
a duopoly setting, there are strategic capacity interactions between firms. The first investor
can choose to overinvest in order to decrease the investment size of its competitor on the
one hand, and delay the entry of its competitor to prolong the monopoly privilege on the
other hand (see Huisman and Kort (2015)).
Among the early contributions that consider flexibility is the static model by Van Mieghem
and Dada (1999). They look at the effect of postponement in capacity, output and price
decisions to the moment that uncertainty is resolved. Compared with production post-
ponement, the price postponement makes the investment decision relatively insensitive to
uncertainty. Chod and Rudi (2005) consider a firm that can use one flexible resource to
produce two goods in a two-stage model. The optimal capacity of flexible resource is
found to be always increasing in both demand variability and demand correlation. In a
three-stage model, Anupindi and Jiang (2008) consider a situation when production can
be decided before or after the demand realization, but the capacity decisions are made ex
ante and pricing decisions ex post. They find that in a more volatile market firms invest
with a larger capacity. By discretizing the dynamic of demand through binomial lattice,
Fontes (2008) compares a fixed capacity strategy with a flexible capacity strategy and finds
that an increase in flexibility leads to a higher predicted value of the project. In continuous
time models, Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Siegel (1985), and Adkins and
Paxson (2012) consider the possibility to switch from operation to suspension and back to
operation at a certain cost. In this chapter we investigate the flexibility to adjust production
between zero and the invested capacity level at any time.
This chapter is closely related to Dangl (1999) and Hagspiel et al. (2016). Dangl (1999)
however, does not take into account the possibility that the market demand is so high
that the firm produces up to capacity right after the investment, whereas Hagspiel et al.
(2016) take that into consideration and conclude that the utilization rate decreases when
the market uncertainty increases. Compared to Hagspiel et al. (2016), we adopt a slightly
different demand function, which, however, leads to new implications. The difference in
demand function is that the market size is unbounded in the work of Hagspiel et al. (2016).
The demand function used in this chapter implies a bounded market size. Market size is
related to the number of potential customers or sellers of a product or service. Consider
for instance the market of agricultural machines like the harvesters in a region like the
Netherlands. The population of farmers and the area of farmlands are limited. This results
in an upper bound on demand.
Our main results are the following. First, we find that under a very large market trend,
right after the investment the utilization rate increases with uncertainty. This is due to the
fact that when market trend is very large and uncertainty is low, the firm invests in a capac-
ity relatively close to the maximal size of the market. Higher uncertainty makes it optimal
to invest later, i.e. when demand is larger. As a response to large demand, the firm is willing
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to produce more, while at the same time the capacity increases. This increase is however
relatively small because it was already large. Consequently, it turns out that production in-
creases more than capacity does with uncertainty. This leads to the counterintuitive result
that the utilization rate increases with uncertainty. However, an intermediate market trend
still results in an utilization rate that decreases with uncertainty as in Hagspiel et al. (2016).
A moderately large market trend in turn yields a non-monotonic utilization rate.
We also find that, when the market trend is large, the firm does not produce up to ca-
pacity right after the investment; when the market trend is small, the firm produces up to
capacity; when the market trend is intermediate, there exists a threshold uncertainty level
such that the firm produces below capacity right after the investment above this threshold
and produces up to capacity below this threshold. Lastly, we find interesting results related
to the effect of market trend on investment timing: The optimal timing is delayed for a
larger trend in a less volatile environment and accelerated in a more volatile environment.
This results from the large capacity installment for a small market trend under high market
uncertainty. As the market grows faster, the capacity does not increase a lot due to the
bounded market size we imposed. When the market trend increases, the firm then actually
prefers to invest earlier.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the monopoly in-
vestment problem. The optimal investment decision is determined and analyzed in Section
2.3. A numerical analysis is provided in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model Setup
Consider a monopolist that is considering to undertake an investment to enter a market with
uncertain demand. The market price at any time t ≥ 0, is given by
p(t) = X(t)(1− γq(t)) ,
with q(t) being the firm’s output and γ > 0 a constant. Note that in this inverse demand
function, the market is bounded above in such a way that q(t) ≤ 1/γ holds1. Demand
uncertainty is modeled by {X(t)|t ≥ 0} following the geometric Brownian motion
dX(t) = αX(t)dt +σX(t)dWt ,
where X(0)> 0, α is the trend parameter, σ (σ > 0) is the volatility parameter, and dWt is
the increment of a Wiener process. The firm is risk-neutral and the discount rate r > 0 is
assumed to satisfy r > α and r > σ2−α . The first inequality is standard and the problem
1There is no upper bound for the demand function p(t) = X(t)− γq(t) adopted in Hagspiel et al. (2016).
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makes sense only when it holds. If this inequality does not hold, by choosing to invest later,
the integral representing the discounted revenue flow could be made infinitely larger. Thus
it is always better for the firm to delay the investment, and the optimum would not exist
(see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). The second inequality is because the Brownian motion
process {1/X(t)|t ≥ 0} has a trend of σ2−α , which should also be smaller than r to avoid
delaying investment forever for the same argument2. From now on, we drop the argument
of time whenever there can be no misunderstanding.
Once the investment is made, the firm becomes active and can decide on the production
level, which is bounded from above by the installed capacity K ≥ 0. The unit cost for
acquiring capacity is δ > 0, and the unit cost for production is c > 0.
2.3 Optimal Investment Decision
This section is about the optimal investment decision of a monopoly firm. We first de-
termine the firm’s optimal production decisions and corresponding instantaneous profit
π(X ,K) for a given K. Once the firm becomes active in the market with installed capacity
K ≥ 0, it chooses at level X of an output to maximize the profit flow, i.e.
π (X ,K) = max
0≤q≤K
(p− c)q = max
0≤q≤K
[X (1− γq)− c]q. (2.1)
There are three possibilities for the firm’s output levels. Production will be temporarily
suspended when X falls below c and resumed when X rises above c. For the resumed pro-
duction, the firm either produces below capacity or up to capacity. The optimal production
and corresponding profit are determined in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. For invested capacity K ≥ 0, and level X > 0, the optimal monopoly
production output is




0 0 < X < c,
X−c
2γX X ≥ c and K > X−c2γX ,
K X ≥ c and 0≤ K ≤ X−c2γX .
(2.2)
2It should be noted that the optimal output, corresponding profit and option value of the firm are propor-
tional to 1/X when the firm produces below capacity right after the investment, as can be inferred from (2.2),
(2.3) and (2.8) later on.









Figure 2.1: Comparison of investment capacity K and optimal production outputs q(X ,K).
In Region 1, q(X ,K) = 0; in Region 2, q(X ,K) = (X − c)/(2γX); and in Region 3,
q(X ,K) = K.
The corresponding profit is




0 0 < X < c,
(X−c)2
4γX X ≥ c and K > X−c2γX ,
[X (1− γK)− c]K X ≥ c and 0≤ K ≤ X−c2γX .
(2.3)
The comparison between production output and investment capacity is illustrated in
Figure 2.1, where the line X = c and the curve (X− c)/(2γX) divide the (X ,K)-space into
three regions. In Region 1, where 0< X < c, there is no production. Region 2 is to the right
of X = c and above the curve (X−c)/(2γX). It is the region where the optimal output level
is lower than the invested capacity. Region 3 is below the curve (X − c)/(2γX), where the
production is constrained by the capacity and the firm produces an output level being equal
to the installed capacity.











which is conditional on the available information at time 0 with X(0) set equal to X , where
T is the moment of investment and π (X ,K) is the maximum profit of the firm at time t ≥ T
if capacity K has been invested.
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Let X∗ be the value of the Brownian motion where the firm is indifferent between con-
tinuation and stopping, and let the corresponding acquired capacity be K∗. For X(0)> X∗,
the firm is in the stopping region and it is optimal to invest immediately. For 0<X(0)<X∗,
demand is too low to undertake investment. Then the firm is in the continuation region and
waits with investing until X reaches X∗. We study the scenario that X(0)< X∗. So it is not
optimal to invest at the initial point of time. The optimal investment time T equals to the
first time that the stochastic process X that starts at X(0) at time zero reaches X∗. Denote by
V (X ,K) the value after investment given that the level of the geometric Brownian motion
is X and capacity K has been installed. Next we obtain a dynamic programming equation.













where, for the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the arguments of the function V (X(t),K).
Then it follows that V satisfies the Bellman equation




Substitution of (2.5) into the Bellman equation and also using the fact that E[∂V∂X σXdW ] =









− rV (X ,K)+π (X ,K) = 0. (2.7)
Substitution of (2.3) into (2.7), and employing value matching and smooth pasting give
the value after the investment:













X ≥ c and K > X−c2γX ,




































The expression and derivation of L(K), M1 (K), M2 and N (K), the proofs of their signs
and the following propositions are presented in the Appendix. L(K)Xβ1 is positive and
increases with X . The monopolist does not produce right after investment because the
demand is too small. L(K)Xβ1 represents the option value to start producing in the future
and this happens as soon as X reaches c. M1(K)Xβ1 is negative and corrects for the fact that
if X reaches c/(1−2γK), the firm’s output will be constrained by the installed capacity size
K. M2(K)Xβ2 is also negative and corrects for the positive quadratic form of cash flows
such that if X drops below c, the monopolist would temporarily suspend the production.
N(K)Xβ2 is positive and stands for the option value that if X falls below c/(1−2γK), the
firm would produce below capacity.
We find the optimal investment decision in two steps. First, for any given level of the ge-
ometric Brownian motion X , the optimal value of K is found by maximizing V (X ,K)−δK.
Second, let the value before investment be AXβ . Then the optimal investment threshold
and capacity level are derived. The two steps are summarized in the following proposition,
where σ̄ > 0 is a value of the drift parameter that determines if the firm produces below or

















Proposition 2.2. There are two possibilities regarding the firm’s investment decision:
1. Suppose either α > δ r2/(c+δ r), or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r) and σ > σ̄ .
Then the firm does not produce up to capacity right after the investment. For any





























−δK(X) = 0. (2.13)
3σ̄ is only defined for the situation of r− c/δ < α < δ r2/(c+δ r).
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If X(0)< X∗, the optimal capacity is K∗ = K(X∗). If X(0)≥ X∗, the firm invests in
capacity K∗ = K(X(0)) immediately at t = 0.
2. Suppose either α ≤ r− c/δ , or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r) and σ ≤ σ̄ . Then
the firm produces up to capacity right after the investment. For any X ≥ c, the optimal










−δ = 0, (2.14)










−δK = 0, (2.15)
with K =K(X). If X(0)< X∗, the firm invests in capacity K∗=K(X∗). If X(0)≥ X∗,
the firm invests in capacity K∗ = K(X(0)) immediately at t = 0.
Besides presenting the optimal investment threshold and capacity level, Proposition 2.2
also shows how the market affects the flexible firm’s production decision right after the
investment. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. If the market is growing fast (α > δ r2/(c+
δ r)), right after the investment the firm chooses an output below the installed capacity.
The initially unused capacity can be employed later to meet an increased market demand.
However, if the market is growing very slowly or even shrinking (α ≤ r− c/δ ), the firm
produces at full capacity right after investment4. If the market trend is at an intermediate
level (r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+ δ r)), the market uncertainty plays a decisive role in the
decision of whether to produce up to full capacity right after the investment. In a more
volatile environment (σ > σ̄ ), producing below capacity makes the extra capacity idle. The
extra capacity will be used when the price level is higher. For a more certain environment
(σ ≤ σ̄ ), such an extra capacity is not needed, and the firm produces up to full capacity
right after the investment.
2.4 Numerical Analysis
This section focuses on the influence of the market trend and uncertainty on the investment
decision and the utilization rate right after the investment. The utilization rate is equal
to the ratio q∗/K∗ with q∗ = q(X∗,K∗). It gives insight into the overall slack of the firm
right after investment. The capacity utilization tends to fluctuate with business cycles as
the firm adjusts output levels in response to changing demand. Low capacity utilization is
a concern for the authority and the firm because it means a large amount of the installed
4Note that we allow for r < c/δ .
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of market trend α and uncertainty σ affecting the firm to produce
below capacity (Region 2), or up to capacity (Region 3), right after the investment.
capacity is idle and stimulative efforts are needed to increase the market demand. It has
been shown that for the unbounded demand function p(t) = X(t)− γq(t), at given level of
the market trend, the utilization rate decreases significantly with market uncertainty (see
Hagspiel et al. (2016)). However, this section shows that for our model, if the market trend
is large enough, the utilization rate increases with market uncertainty.
2.4.1 Market trend
We first look at how market trend affects the optimal investment timing and capacity when
the firm produces below capacity right after the investment. As shown in Figure 2.3 we
have that, when the market uncertainty is low, both the optimal investment time and the
investment capacity increase with market trend. This is because when deciding how much
to invest in a less volatile environment, the firm considers the market increase after the
investment and installs a large capacity in case of a high market demand, which makes it
reasonable to invest later. However, when the market uncertainty is high, Figure 2.3a shows
that the firm invests slightly earlier for a larger market trend. The reason is that in a highly
volatile environment, the firm still invests in a larger capacity for a larger market trend. But
since the capacity level is already at a high level when the market grows slowly (Figure
2.3b), with a larger market trend the capacity does not increase a lot, and the resulting
effect on investment timing is low.5 This makes that in a higher uncertain environment, the
firm prefers to invest earlier when the market trend goes up, because the firm is more eager
to invest in such a market.
5Note that with this demand function, the optimal capacity size is always below 1/(2γ).
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of investment timing and capacity as function of market trend α
under different uncertainty levels σ when producing below capacity right after the invest-
ment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
The influence of the market trend α on the utilization rate q∗/K∗ is shown in Figure
2.4. Regardless of the uncertainty level, the utilization rate decreases with α . This is
because when deciding on capacity, the future market is considered. This implies that for
a larger α , a larger capacity will be installed. At the same time, only the current market
is important when deciding about the production amount. The current market size is small
compared to the future market size when α is large. This makes that the production level
is low compared to capacity, hence a low utilization rate results. Moreover, the utilization
rate decreases less fast with α for larger σ . The intuition is that the rate of increase in the
installed capacity is lower than that in production output for larger σ , since, as before, the
optimal capacity is already close to its upper bound 1/(2γ) when σ is large.
2.4.2 Market uncertainty
When the market trend α is small, the utilization rate equals to 1 and is unaffected by the
market uncertainty. When α is at an intermediate level, Figure 2.5 shows that the utilization
rate is 1 for small market uncertainty σ , as is also illustrated in Figure 2.2, and decreases
as market uncertainty σ increases. When α is large, the utilization rate increases with σ ,
and when α is moderately large, the utilization rate can both increase and decrease with σ .
The intuition behind this is as follows.
If α is at intermediate level, i.e. r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r/(c + δ r), then the firm invests
later in a larger capacity when σ goes up. This is shown in Figure 2.6. Given the other
parameter values (r, γ , c, and δ ) in Figure 2.6, the firm produces right after the investment
below capacity for α = 0.02,σ > 0.2866 and α = 0.03,σ > 0.1473; and up to capacity
for α = 0.02,σ ≤ 0.2866 and α = 0.03,σ ≤ 0.1473. The firm invests in a larger capacity
in a more volatile environment, because more future uncertainty makes excess capacity
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of utilization rate as function of market trend α under different
uncertainty levels σ when producing below capacity right after the investment. Parameter
values are r = 0.1, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.


















Figure 2.5: Illustration of utilization rate as function of the market uncertainty level σ
under different market trends α . Parameter values are r = 0.1, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of investment timing and capacity as functions of uncertainty level
σ under different market trends α . Parameter values are r = 0.1, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
desirable to match upward demand shocks. Since the required capacity at the moment of
investment is larger, so is the investment cost, the firm requests a higher output price when
it invests, implying that the optimal threshold increases also. The delayed timing suggests
that the output level is also increasing. But for an intermediate α , this happens in a more
gradual way. Thus, the utilization rate decreases with uncertainty when the firm produces
below capacity right after the investment. The finding that the utilization rate is decreasing
with uncertainty for an intermediate α (take α = 0.02 for example) is consistent with the
findings in Hagspiel et al. (2016).
If α is large, i.e. α > δ r2/(c+ δ r), there are two possibilities. When α is very large,
take α = 0.06 for example, in Figure 2.6b, the optimal capacity is already at a high level
for small σ . Then the capacity upper bound of 1/(2γ) is relatively close, so the capacity
increases slowly with σ . However, the optimal investment timing is delayed a lot compared
with the optimal capacity. This implies the output right after the investment increases
quite a lot. Thus, for a very large α , the utilization rate increases with uncertainty. This
result is not present in the work of Hagspiel et al. (2016), because because our model is
based on different demand functions. In their work the market is not bounded, whereas
in this chapter, we have that a positive market price requires the quantity to be always
below 1/γ . When α is moderately large, for example, α = 0.035 or 0.04 in Figure 2.5, the
utilization rate does not change monotonically with uncertainty. In fact, the opposite effects
for intermediate α and very large α above occur here, causing the non-monotonicity.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the investment decisions of a monopoly firm with access to volume
flexibility in a dynamic uncertain environment. In such an environment, not only the un-
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certainty, but also the market trend has significant qualitative effects on the timing, the
investment capacity size, and the decision whether to produce up to capacity right after the
investment. We show that a large (small) market trend corresponds to producing below (up
to) capacity right after the investment. An intermediate market trend and an uncertainty
level above (below) a certain threshold yields an output level below (up to) capacity right
after the investment. The utilization rate is increasing with market uncertainty when the
trend is very large, shows no monotonicity when the trend is moderately large, and de-
creases with uncertainty when the trend is intermediate. Moreover, we find that capacity
increases and the utilization rate decreases with the market trend. However, the investment
timing is delayed in a more certain market, but accelerated in a more volatile market.
A limitation of the model is that the firm can only invest once. If the firm can undertake
several investments during its life time, then the decision to produce up to/below capacity
after investment is probably going to be affected by the frequency and moments of invest-
ments, which could be an interesting topic for future research. Another interesting topic
is to introduce competition by studying a duopoly framework. Then Huisman and Kort
(2015), where firms are obliged to produce up to capacity, is extended by allowing the
firms to produce below capacity. The implication is that the firm can no longer commit
to a high production level, which leads to a significant change in the resulting strategic
interactions.
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Optimal output q(X ,K) equals to 0 when there is no production
right after investment and equals to K when the firm produces up to capacity right after
investment. When the firm produces below capacity right after investment, the optimal
output q∗(X ,K) maximizes [X(1− γa)− c]q. Substituting q∗(X ,K) into [X(1− γa)− c]q
yields the corresponding profits.
Identification of L(K), M1 (K), M2, and N (K) Given the value function in different re-
gions and according to the value matching and smooth pasting conditions at X1 = c and














































































r (r−α)(r+α−σ2) . (2.20)






















































































































































From (2.18), we get N (K) as

































































































F (β1) . (2.23)
From the additional proof for Proposition 2.2, β1 > 0, β2 <−1, F(β1)< 0 and F(β2)> 0,
implying L(K)> 0, M1(K)< 0, M2(K)< 0 and N(K)> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 The proof of Proposition 2.2 consists of two parts. The first part
derives the optimal investment timing and investment capacity for producing below and
producing up to capacity right after the investment. The second part derives conditions
when the firm will produce up to or below capacity right after the investment.
Derivation of optimal investment timing and capacity First, for any X > 0 find the
optimal value of the investment capacity, K(X), that maximizes the option value minus
the cost of investment V (X ,K)− δK. Then the optimal investment timing X∗ is derived
by using this optimal value. For X < X∗, let the value of the investment option in the
continuation region be AXβ1 . According to value matching and smooth pasting conditions




AX∗β1 =V (X∗,K (X∗))−δK (X∗) ,
β1AX∗β1−1 = ddX [V (X ,K (X))−δK (X)]
∣∣
X=X∗ ,
so X∗ is a solution of the equation















• If the firm does not produce right after the investment, then K(X) should maximize





The first order condition implies

















The second order partial derivative of V (X ,K) with respect to K is negative6, so there
is a global maximum for V (X ,K)− δK when the firm does not produce right after
the investment.
Determine the optimal investment timing X∗ according to (2.24), then X∗ is the so-








which is equivalent to K(X∗) = 0, contradicting to the assumption that firm invests
but does not produce. So if the firm invests, the firm produces right after the invest-
ment.
• If the firm produces below capacity right after the investment, then the option value
of the project is








with M1(K), M2 as in (2.22) and (2.21). Letting the first order partial derivative of
V (X ,K)−δK with respect to K equal 0 gives K (X), the same as (2.25). Because the
second order partial derivative of V (X ,K)− δK with respect to K is negative, there
is a global maximum at K (X).
Next, we determine the optimal investment timing X∗. If (2.24) has admissible solu-
6From additional proof for Proposition 2.2, β1 > 1, β2 < 0, F(β1)< 0, and F(β2)> 0.
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tions, then we get






























































In case the derived K (X∗) is such that K (X∗)≤ X∗−c2γX∗ , i.e. the capacity is not bigger
than the optimal output, then it contradicts to that the firm produces below capacity
right after the investment. Thus, the firm would not invest for this case.
• If the firm produces up to capacity right after the investment, then the value of the
project is






where N (K) is as in (2.23). The first order condition of V (X ,K)−δK with respect










−δ = 0. (2.26)
In order to check the second order partial derivative of V (X ,K)−δK with respect to
K, we let










F (β1)c1−β2 (β2 +1)
2(β1−β2)









So the second order partial derivative of V (X ,K)− δK with respective to K is
negative, implying if equation (2.26) has an admissible solution, there is a maxi-
mum V (X ,K (X))− δK (X). If (2.26) does not have any admissible solution, then
V (X ,K)−δK is increasing or decreasing with K, and the firm would not invest for
this case. We can rule out the increasing case, because it implies more capacity is
better. Particularly, capacity that is bigger than (X − c)/(2γX) is better. This sug-
gests the firm should invest for the case of producing below capacity right after the
investment. For the decreasing case, it implies that the optimal investment capacity
is 0, we can also rule out the decreasing case.
If (2.24) has admissible solutions, then the optimal investment threshold X∗ is the
solution of the following equation,
N (K (X))Xβ2 +









β2N (K (X))Xβ2−1 +




Rearranging terms gives that X∗ implicitly satisfies
β1−β2
β1
N (K (X∗))X∗β2 +
β1−1
β1





−δK (X∗) = 0.
If this equation does not give any admissible solution or gives a solution that is
smaller than c, or K (X∗) > (X∗− c)/(2γX∗), then the firm would not invest in this
case.
Derivation of conditions for producing up to or below capacity right after the invest-
ment If the firm produces below capacity right after the investment (Region 2), then for
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For any X ≥ c, right after the investment, the firm either produces below capacity or up




At the boundary of Region 2 and 3, the equality holds. For Region 2, we get the optimal





The optimal value of investment capacity at the boundary for Region 3 is the solution to
(2.26) when
2δ (β1−β2) = c(1+β1)F (β2) . (2.27)



























































































































K(X) = X−c2γX is a solution for this equation, implying there is smooth transfer from Region
2 to Region 3.
Next, we determine σ̄ such that equation (2.27) holds as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Sub-





= [2δ r (r−α)−αc]
√
(σ̄2−2α)2 +8rσ̄2. (2.28)
Two cases are considered:










2δ (β1−β2)< c(1+β1)F (β2) ,
and it is Region 2 defined.
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Then we have the following subcases.
• If 0 < Λ < α2, which is α > r2δc+rδ , then ∆ < 0 and (2.29) has no solution for








(2r−α)σ2 +4Λα2−4α4 < 0,
which implies
2δ (β1−β2)< c(1+β1)F (β2) .
So, it is Region 2 defined.
• If α2 ≤ Λ < (2r−α)2, which is equivalent to r− cδ < α ≤ δ r
2
c+δ r , then ∆ ≥ 0,
and it holds that σ̄21 ≤ 0 and σ̄22 ≥ 0. So there is one solution for σ̄ > 0 and
σ̄ = σ̄2. For any σ > 0 with σ2 < r+α , Region 3 is defined when 0 < σ ≤ σ̄
and Region 2 is defined when σ > σ̄ .
• If Λ > (2r−α)2, which is α < r− cδ , then σ̄21 < 0 and σ̄22 < 0. So there is no








(2r−α)σ2 +4Λα2−4α4 > 0,
which implies
2δ (β1−β2)> c(1+β1)F (β2).
It is only Region 3 that is defined.
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2δ (β1−β2)> c(1+β1)F (β2),
and Region 3 is defined.
Summarizing the above cases, it can be concluded that when α > δ r2/(c+δ r), it is al-
ways Region 2 that is defined. When r−c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r), there exists σ̄ > 0 such
that if σ̄2 < r+α , then it is Region 3 for σ ≤ σ̄ and Region 2 for σ > σ̄ ; if σ̄2 ≥ r+α ,
then it is always Region 3. When α ≤ r− c/δ , then it is Region 3 that is defined.
Additional proof of ∂F(X ,K)/∂K < 0 for Proposition 2.2 Before we check the sign of
∂F(X ,K)/∂K, we first look at the signs for β1, β2 and F(β1). r > 0 and the assumption
r > α imply (12 − ασ2 )







































































Thus, it can be concluded that β2 <−1.












with r(r−α)(r+α−σ2)> 0 since r > α and r+α > σ2.
If 2α < σ2, then










and if σ2 < 2α , then
r(r−α)(r+α−σ2)F ′(β ) = 2ασ2− rσ2−2α2
= ασ2− rσ2 +ασ2−2α2












Because F (β ) decreases with β , if we can compare the values for β0, β1 and β2, then it











β1 and β2 are the intersection points of G(β ) and the β -axis. If we can show that G(β0)<



































































































Because r > α and σ2 < r+α , we get G(β0)< 0. Thus, F(β1)< 0, and F(β2)> 0. Next,










































































































































































































































































































































































Since β1 > 0, β2 < 0, r−α > 0 and r+α−σ2 > 0, we conclude that if 2α−σ2 ≥ 0, then































































Strategic Capacity Investment under Uncertainty with
Volume Flexibility
This chapter considers investment decisions in an uncertain and competitive framework,
with a first investor, the leader, always producing up to full capacity and a second investor,
the follower, capable of adjusting output levels within the constraint of installed capacity.
Both firms need to decide on the investment timing and the investment capacity levels. The
main findings are as follows. Compared to a situation where the follower always produces
up to full capacity, the leader has a larger incentive to accommodate a flexible follower.
This is because the leader also benefits from the follower’s volume flexibility. Due to the
first mover advantage, the leader’s value is higher than the follower’s value, despite the
follower’s technological advantage in flexibility. This chapter is based on Wen (2017).
3.1 Introduction
Uncertainty is a main characteristic of the business environment nowadays. The technol-
ogy advancement has shortened product life cycles, increased product variety, and indulged
more demanding consumers. This contributes to the uncertainty in consumer demand and
poses challenges on the manufacturing firms. The ability to produce to the least cost is
no longer enough. The capability to absorb demand fluctuations has become an important
competitive issue. Flexibility is considered as an adaptive response to the environmental
uncertainty (Gupta and Goyal, 1989). Browne et al. (1984) define eight different types of
flexibilities, among which the volume flexibility is described as “the ability to operate an
FMS (Flexible Manufacturing Systems) profitably at different production volumes." Sethi
and Sethi (1990) further describe volume flexibility of a manufacturing system as “its abil-
ity to be operated profitably at different overall output levels." According to Beach et al.
(2000), utilizing flexibility presents performance-related benefits. Numerous studies have
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argued for the importance of volume flexibility, see Jack and Raturi (2002). For instance,
Goyal and Netessine (2011) show that volume flexibility may help the firm combat the
product demand uncertainty. In a monopolistic market, Hagspiel et al. (2016) and Wen
et al. (2017) analyze the volume flexibility’s influences on a monopolistic investor’s in-
vestment decision and show that it increases the value of the investment. In a competitive
setting, an important question for the investors would be how the flexibility influences
investment decisions and the investors’ strategic interactions.
This chapter considers volume flexibility in a homogenous good market with exogenous
firm roles. Demand is linear and subject to stochastic shocks, which follow a geometric
Brownian motion process. There are two firms that decide on entering the duopoly market
by investing in a production plant. More specifically, they have to decide about the timing
and the investment capacity. One firm, the leader, has dedicated technology. The other
firm, i.e., the follower who invests second, has volume flexibility. The leader always has
to produce up to capacity and has a first mover advantage. The follower can adjust the
output levels according to market demand. One can easily find both dedicated and flexible
firms in the electricity market: a nuclear power station is dedicated and a fossil fuel power
station is flexible. According to Goyal and Netessine (2007), a firm may find it difficult to
produce below capacity due to fixed costs associated with, for example, labor, commitment
to suppliers and production ramp-up1. A surprising outcome of our research is that, since
the market price is affected by the follower’s flexible output, the leader benefits from the
follower’s flexibility when market demand is low. This is because the follower reduces the
output quantity in such a case.
Our analysis starts with a market where no firms are active. Then two domains on
market sizes are identified for the leader, with one domain where it is optimal to deter the
entry of the flexible follower and the other one where it is optimal to accommodate the
entry. We show that entry deterrence domain increases with uncertainty. This result is the
same as in Huisman and Kort (2015), where the follower is dedicated. Besides, we find
that compared to a dedicated follower, the leader is less likely to deter a flexible follower.
This is because when there is uncertainty about market demand, both the leader and the
flexible follower tend to wait for more information about the market and invest later. For
the entry deterrence strategy, the leader has an incentive to overinvest to deter the entry
of the follower2. Incapable of adjusting to the instant market demand, the leader is more
vulnerable to the negative demand shocks. For the follower, the volume flexibility yields
higher values and thus motivates to invest earlier compared with a dedicated follower. This
results in a shorter monopoly period for the leader and diminishes the attractiveness of entry
deterrence compared to the case where the follower is dedicated. Furthermore, compared
to a dedicated follower, it is more likely for the leader to accommodate a flexible follower.
1I do not model these issues explicitly in this chapter.
2Overinvesting refers to that a firm invests more capacity as the first investor than when investing simul-
taneously with the other firm at a predetermined point of time.
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For the accommodation strategy, the two firms invest at the same time, so the incentive
to overinvest in order to deter the follower’s entry disappears. The market price reacts to
the follower’s output adjustment, and this diminishes the leader’s vulnerability to demand
uncertainty. The incentive to overinvest in order to reduce the capacity size of the flexible
follower and to benefit from the follower’s output adjustment is still strong. This makes
accommodation of the flexible follower more attractive to the leader.
We also find that in a fast growing market, the flexible follower produces below capacity
right after investment. While in a slowly growing or shrinking market, the flexible follower
produces up to capacity right after investment. In the intermediate case, the flexible fol-
lower produces up to capacity right after investment when uncertainty is low and below
capacity when uncertainty is high. These findings are the same as that for the flexible mo-
nopolist by Wen et al. (2017). The strategic interactions between the leader and the flexible
follower do not influence these results. Moreover, there is free riding on the follower’s flex-
ibility since the volume flexibility affects market prices, and thus enlarges the profitability
of the leader. So, the flexible follower cannot fully capture the innovative benefits from
the technology advancement. However, this does not diminish the follower’s incentive to
invest in the volume flexibility technology, because it still generates a larger value for the
follower whether the leader chooses and entry deterrence or entry accommodation strategy.
The duopoly model with volume flexibility first contributes to the research stream of
monopolistic volume flexibility investment combining investment timing and capacity de-
termination, by Dangl (1999), Hagspiel et al. (2016), and Wen et al. (2017). The general
result is that flexibility leads to an increase in the optimal installed capacity and project
value. The influence of flexibility on investment timing depends on two effects, with one
effect that higher value motivates a flexible firm to invest earlier and the other effect that
larger installed capacity motivates it to invest later. This chapter shows that flexibility af-
fects the flexible follower in a similar way as it affects the flexible monopolist. Its influence
on the leader depends on the leader’s competition strategy, and the dedicated leader also
gets a higher value when playing the accommodation strategy.
In this chapter, firms not only make decisions about capacities, but also about invest-
ment timings in the continuous time setting. It contributes to the literature of capacity
choices with volume flexibility in a competitive framework using discrete time models.
Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) study a two-stage model with capacity choice in the first
stage and capacity constrained quantity competition in the second stage and show that the
firms choose the certainty-equivalent Cournot capacity. If the second stage is a capacity-
constrained price competition instead of quantity competition, Reynolds and Wilson (2000)
find that symmetric equilibrium does not exist in pure strategies for capacity choices if
demand is sufficient volatile. Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) consider two types of com-
petition: quantity competition and price competition in each period of an infinite time
horizon. Quantity competition results in an industry structure of equal-sized firms, while
price competition results in unequal-sized firms.
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Besides the economics literature, volume flexibility is also studied in operations man-
agement. For example, Anupindi and Jiang (2008) consider the volume flexibility in a
three-stage framework: capacity choice in the first stage, production decisions in the sec-
ond stage and pricing decisions in the third stage. Flexible firms can make production
decisions when demand is observed. Under competition, they find that firms choose to
be inflexible for multiplicative demand shocks, while flexible for additive demand shocks.
In a two-product setting with demand uncertainty for both products, Goyal and Netessine
(2011) introduce volume flexibility and find that volume flexibility combats aggregate de-
mand uncertainty for the two products. Current research on volume flexibility focuses
more on the capacity choices and adopts discrete time models in the analysis. For every
dynamic period, the firm needs to decide whether and how much to invest conditional on
the available information at the beginning of the period, see for instance Besanko and Do-
raszelski (2004) and Besanko et al. (2010). In these two papers, the purpose is to analyze
the firm sizes in market equilibria. By using a continuous time model, this chapter ana-
lyzes the decision on both investment timing and investment capacity. More specifically,
this research analyzes the influence of volume flexibility on the timing of market entry. In
a competitive setting, the first investor has a larger incentive to accommodate than to deter
the entry of the second investor, given the second investor has volume flexibility. This is
due to the fact that volume flexibility combats demand uncertainty for both investors in the
market, similarly as that proposed by Goyal and Netessine (2011) for two products.
The duopoly model with flexibility in this research also extends the literature on en-
try deterrence and entry accommodation investment. According to Lieberman and Mont-
gomery (1988), the first investor’s investment serves as a commitment to maintain a high
level of production output, which is a price cut threat to decrease entrant’s profit. Spence
(1977) and Dixit (1980) study preemptive commitment by constructing static investment
models and show that entry can be deterred by installing excess capacity to make a new en-
trant unprofitable. Maskin (1999) introduces uncertainty and obtains the same conclusion.
By discrete time models, Reynolds (1987) shows that the equilibrium capacity choice is a
decreasing function of the current rival capacity. Besanko et al. (2010) argue that preemp-
tion is more likely when the products in the market have low heterogeneity and there is
uncertainty about the entrant’s exact cost/benefit of capacity addition/withdrawal. In this
chapter, the products are homogeneous, time is continuous, and there is uncertainty about
the market demand. The asymmetric firm roles of a dedicated leader and a flexible follower,
are direct extensions of symmetric firm roles of both a dedicated leader and a dedicated fol-
lower by Huisman and Kort (2015). This chapter shows that in a continuous time setting,
excess capacity can help the first investor to deter the entry of the second investor and the
second investor’s optimal capacity decreases with the first investor’s capacity. However,
the first investor’s optimal investment timing and capacity are independent of the second
investor’s volume flexibility. Moreover, when the second investor has volume flexibility,
the entry accommodation is more likely when the products are homogenous and there is
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market demand uncertainty. For the given incumbent’s decisions, Yang and Zhou (2007)
show that it is impossible for the incumbent with excess capacity to deter the potential
entrant who holds the option to entry forever. This result is supported also by Huisman
and Kort (2015), who not only consider the deterrence of the potential entrant, but also the
possibility of accommodation of the potential entrant. They construct the domains on mar-
ket sizes of entry deterrence and accommodation strategy for the duopoly setting where
the only difference between investors is the cost advantage for the first investor. In this
chapter, the difference between the two investors is that the leader always produces up to
full capacity, while the follower can adjust the output within the capacity constraint. Sim-
ilar to Huisman and Kort (2015), this chapter also constructs the domains for the leader’s
entry strategies. By comparing situation of volume flexibility with situation of no volume
flexibility, this chapter shows that the first investor has less incentive to deter the entry of
the second investor if the second investor has volume flexibility.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the duopoly investment
problem. Section 3.3 analyses the flexible follower’s optimal investment decision. The
dedicated leader’s optimal investment decision is derived in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, the
influence of flexibility on the leader and the follower is analysed. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
Consider a framework where two firms can invest in production capacity to enter a market
or serve a particular demand. Of the two firms, the follower (second investor) can access
volume flexibility technology and adjust output levels up to the installed capacity after
the investment. The leader (first investor) has no access to such technology and can only
produce at full capacity level. Denote by KD ≥ 0 and KF ≥ 0 the capacity of the flexible
follower and dedicated leader, respectively. For both firms, the unit cost for capacity in-
vestment is δ > 0 and the unit cost for production is c > 0. The price at time t ≥ 0 is p(t),
given by the inverse demand function
p(t) = X(t) [1− γ (qD (t)+qF (t))] ,
where γ > 0 is a constant, qD (t) and qF (t) denote the production output for the dedi-
cated and flexible firm at time t, respectively, and the uncertainty in demand, {X(t)|t ≥ 0},
follows a geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) process
dX(t) = αX(t)dt +σX(t)dWt ,
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in which X(0) > 0, α is the trend parameter, σ > 0 is the volatility parameter, and dWt is
the increment of a Wiener process. The inverse linear demand function has among others
been adopted by Pindyck (1988) and Huisman and Kort (2015). Both firms are risk neutral
and have a discount rate of r, which is assumed to be larger than α , the trend of GBM X(t),
and larger than σ2−α , the trend for GBM {1/X(t)}. This is to prevent that it is optimal
for the firms to always delay the investment (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). From now on
we drop the argument of time whenever there can be no misunderstanding.
3.3 Flexible Follower’s Optimal Investment Decision
The leader is assumed to be already in the market when the flexible follower makes in-
vestment decisions. Given level X(t) = X and the leader’s investment capacity KD, denote
πF(X ,KD,KF) as the profit for the flexible follower after investing in capacity KF . The
follower is flexible and can adjust its production between 0 and the invested capacity KF .
The output by the flexible follower maximises the profit flow, which is
πF (X ,KD,KF) = max
0≤qF≤KF
{X [1− γ (KD +qF)]− c}qF .
Given 0≤ KD < 1/γ , the optimal production level for the follower is



















The corresponding profit flow is




0 0 < X < c1−γKD ,
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The flexible follower’s investment decision is solved as an optimal stopping problem and
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conditional on the available information at time 0, where T is the time when the flexible
follower invests, and KF is the acquired capacity at time T . Denote by VF(X ,KD,KF) the
value for the flexible follower, it satisfies the Bellman equation




Similar to the previous chapter, applying Ito’s Lemma, substituting and rewriting lead to









− rVF(X ,KD,KF)+πF(X ,KD,KF) = 0.
(3.4)
Substituting (3.2) into (3.4) and employing value matching and smooth pasting for X =
c/(1− γKD) and X = c/(1− γKD−2γKF) yield the follower’s value after investment as




L(KD,KF)Xβ1 0 < X < c1−γKD ,














N (KD,KF)Xβ2− cKFr +
KF−γKDKF−γK2F







































The expressions and derivation of L(KD,KF), M1(KD,KF), M2(KD), N(KD,KF), as well as
all the proofs of the following propositions, lemmas and corollaries can be found in the
appendix. If KD = 0, the model reduces to monopoly case. The follower does not produce
right after the investment for 0 < X < c/(1− γKD). Thus, L(KD,KF)Xβ1 is positive and
represents the option value to start producing in the future as soon as X reaches c/(1−
γKD). M1(KD,KF)Xβ1 is negative and corrects for the fact that if X reaches c/(1− γKD−
2γKF), the follower’s output will be constrained by the installed capacity level. M2(KD)Xβ2
is negative and corrects for the positive quadratic form of cash flows such that when X drops
below c/(1−γKD), the follower would temporarily suspend the production. N(KD,KF)Xβ2
is positive and describes the option value that if demand decreases, e.g., X drops below
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c/(1− γKD− 2γKD), the follower produces below full capacity. The optimal investment
decision is found in two steps. First, given KD and the level of X , the optimal value of
KF is found by maximising VF(X ,KD,KF)− δKF , which yields KF(X ,KD). Second, the
optimal investment threshold X∗F(KD) for the follower can be derived. The two steps are
















. σ̄ > 0 is a value of the drift parameter that determines if the
follower produces below or up to capacity right after investment. σ̄ is only defined for
r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r).
Proposition 3.1. Given the dedicated firm has already invested in capacity KD ∈ [0,1/γ),
there are two possibilities regarding the follower’s investment decisions:
1. Suppose α > δ r2/(c+δ r), or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r) and σ > σ̄ . Then
the follower does not produce up to capacity right after investment. For any X ≥
c/(1−γKD), the optimal capacity KF(X ,KD) that maximizes V (X ,KD,KF)−δKF is

































−δKF(X ,KD) = 0. (3.10)
If X(0)< X∗F(KD), then the optimal capacity of the follower is K
∗
F(KD) = KF (X
∗
F(KD),KD).
If X(0) ≥ X∗F(KD), then the follower invests immediately at t = 0 with capacity
K∗F(KD) = KF(X(0),KD).
2. Suppose α ≤ r− c/δ , or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r) and σ ≤ σ̄ . Then the
follower produces up to capacity right after the investment. For any X ≥ c/(1−
γKD), the optimal capacity KF(X ,KD) that maximizes V (X ,KD,KF)−δKF satisfies
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−δKF = 0, (3.12)
with KF = KF(X ,KD). If X(0) < X∗F(KD), then the optimal capacity of the follower
is K∗F(KD) = KF(X
∗
F(KD),KD). If X(0)≥ X∗F(KD), then the follower invests immedi-
ately at t = 0 with capacity K∗F(KD) = KF(X(0),KD).
From Proposition 3.1, the influence of the leader’s investment capacity on the follower’s
investment decision is concluded in Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. The dedicated leader’s capacity level KD influences the follower’s invest-
ment decision: If the leader invests more, the follower invests later and invests less.
This is intuitive because the leader always produces up to capacity after investment,
and the more the leader invests, the smaller market share is left for the flexible follower
regardless of whether the follower produces below or up to capacity after investment. When
deciding on the investment capacity, the follower takes the future market demand into
consideration. Thus, the decline in the market share decreases the follower’s investment
capacity. For a given GBM level X , the leader’s increased capacity also lowers the market
price. This delays the follower’s investment because the follower needs to wait for a higher
market price.
3.4 Dedicated Leader’s Optimal Investment Decision
When deciding on the investment timing and capacity, the leader takes the follower’s in-
vestment decision into account. For a given level of X(t) = X at time t, suppose the leader
invests at t with capacity size KD. Because the follower’s optimal threshold X∗F(KD) in-
creases with KD, the leader can invest in a larger (smaller) capacity size such that the
follower invests later (earlier). Assume there exists a critical capacity size for the leader,
K̂D(X), such that the follower’s optimal threshold satisfies X∗F(K̂D) = X . This critical ca-
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From Corollary 3.1, it can be concluded that if KD ≤ K̂D(X), then X ≥ X∗F(KD), implying
that the follower invests at the same time with the leader. If KD > K̂D(X), then X <X∗F(KD),
which implies that the follower invests later than the leader. The former case corresponds to
the leader’s entry accommodation strategy and the latter corresponds to its entry deterrence
strategy, as described by Huisman and Kort (2015). In the following analysis, the dedicated
leader’s value function is derived and the leader’s optimal entry accommodation and entry
deterrence strategy are characterized as local maximum to the leader’s value maximization

















where T is the moment that the flexible follower invests. It holds that T > 0 under the entry
deterrence strategy and T = 0 under the entry accommodation strategy.
To derive the leader’s value function, first take a look at the leader’s profit after the
follower invests. Because of volume flexibility, the follower might not produce, produce
below, and produces up to capacity after investment. For each of these three cases, given
GBM level X and the invested capacity size KD, the leader’s profit flow πD(X ,KD), when





KD(1− γKD)X− cKD if 0 < X < c1−γKD ,
KD












Applying Ito’s Lemma, substituting and rewriting leads to the following differential









− rVD(X ,KD)+πD(X ,KD) = 0.
Substituting πD into this differential equation and employing value matching and smooth
pasting at X = c/(1− γKD) and X = c/(1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD)) give the value of the leader
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L(KD)Xβ1 + KD(1−γKD)r−α X−
cKD




















The derivation and expressions of L(KD),M1(KD),M2(KD) and N (KD) with their signs
can be found in the appendix.
For 0 ≤ X < c/(1− γKD), the demand is very small and the follower’s production
is temporarily suspended. However, incapable of adjusting to the market demand, the
leader still produces at full capacity. In the leader’s value function, L(KD)Xβ1 measures
the decrease in the leader’s value when the follower resumes production in the future.
This happens as soon as X becomes larger than c/(1− γKD). For c/(1− γKD) ≤ X <
c/(1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD)), e.g., X ≥ c/(1− γKD) and K∗F(KD) > (X− c)/(2γX)−KD/2,
the follower produces below capacity right after investment. M1(KD)Xβ1 corrects for the
fact that if X reaches c/(1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD)), then the production of the follower is
constrained by the follower’s installed capacity, hence the value of the leader increases.
The term M2(KD)Xβ2 denotes the decrease in the leader’s option value. This is due to
the fact that when X falls below c/(1− γKD), the market demand becomes so small that
the follower suspends production, whereas the leader still produces at full capacity, which
results in negative profit. For X ≥ c/(1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD)), e.g., X ≥ c/(1− γKD) and
K∗F(KD)≤ (X− c)/(2γX)−KD/2, the follower produces up to capacity right after invest-
ment. The termN (KD)Xβ2 corrects for the fact that if X drops below c/(1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD)),
then the follower produces below capacity, and the value of the leader would increase.
In what follows, we analyze the leader’s strategies for two cases, i.e., the follower pro-
duces below and up to capacity right after investment. This is because from Wen et al.
(2017), the flexible firm always produces right after investment. Before the follower in-
vests, the leader’s value function consists of two parts with one part from the monopolistic
profit flow, and the other part correcting the changes in values when the follower invests
and the leader loses its monopoly privilege. When the leader invests at X , let the dedicated
leader’s value before the follower invests take the following form
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where B(KD) has different expressions and will be derived for the two cases3. The leader’s
value after the follower invests is shown in (3.14). Then in every case two leader’s strategies
are analyzed, namely the entry deterrence strategy and the entry accommodation strategy.
We begin with the case of below capacity, then we analyze the case of up to capacity.
• The flexible follower produces below capacity right after the investment when α >
δ r2/(c+δ r), or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r) and σ > σ̄ .
The leader’s value function given that the leader invests at X before and after the fol-
lower’s entry is as follows
VD(X ,KD) =
{
B1(KD)Xβ1 + KD(1−γKD)r−α X−
cKD
r X < X
∗
F(KD),
M1(KD)Xβ1 +M2(KD)Xβ2 + KD(1−γKD)2(r−α) X−
cKD











according to value matching at the follower’s investment threshold X∗F(KD), which is de-
fined by (3.10). Intuitively, B1(KD) is negative (see appendix). It corrects for the fact that
when X(t) reaches X∗F(KD), the follower enters the market, putting an end to the leader’s
monopolistic privilege. The leader’s entry deterrence and accommodation strategies when
the follower produces below capacity right after investment are described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose α > δ r2/(c+ δ r), or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+ δ r) and
σ > σ̄ .
(a) Entry Deterrence Strategy




















3B(KD) and L(KD) are different. The fundamental component (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) in the
leader’s value function, KD(1−γKD)r X−
KD
r , is generated by the profit flows. L(KD)Xβ1 describes the deviation
of VD(X ,KD) from the fundamental component due to the possibility that X will move across the bound-
ary c1−γKD . B(KD)X
β1 describes the deviation of VD(X ,KD) from the fundamental component due to the
possibility that X will move across the follower’s optimal investment threshold X∗F .
















−δ = 0, (3.17)












−δ = 0. (3.18)
The optimal investment threshold XdetD and investment capacity K
det














when X < XdetD and X
det
D ∈ [Xdet1 ,Xdet2 ]. If XdetD ≤ X ≤ Xdet2 , in order to implement the
entry deterrence strategy, the leader invests immediately at X with capacity KdetD (X),
which satisfies (3.18). The value of the entry deterrence strategy is









(b) Entry Accommodation Strategy
The entry accommodation strategy will be considered if X ≥ Xacc1 , where Xacc1 and the
corresponding KaccD (X
acc












−δ = 0. (3.20)

















−δ = 0, (3.21)
when X < XaccD and X
acc
D ≥ Xacc1 . The optimal investment capacity for the entry accom-
modation strategy is




If X ≥XaccD , in order to implement the entry accommodation strategy, the leader invests
immediately at X with capacity KaccD (X) that satisfies (3.20). The value of the entry
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accommodation strategy is
V accD (X) =M1(KaccD (X))Xβ1 +M2(KaccD (X))Xβ2
+





A numerical example is provided to demonstrate how the leader plays against a flexible
follower when the follower produces below capacity right after investment. Figure 3.1
illustrates the capacity levels K̂D, KdetD , and K
acc
D as functions of X . For the given parameter
values, the leader would consider the entry deterrence strategy for X ∈ [Xdet1 ,Xdet2 ], and
the entry accommodation strategy for X ≥ Xacc1 . When both strategies are applicable, the
dedicated leader would choose the strategy that generates higher value.















Figure 3.1: Illustration of K̂D(X), KdetD (X), and K
acc
D (X) when the flexible follower pro-
duces below capacity right after investment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03,
σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
More specifically, for the given parameter values in Figure 3.1, Xdet1 = 2.42, X
det
2 =
11.73. The optimal threshold for entry deterrence strategy is XdetD = 6.30. Suppose the
current level of geometric Brownian motion is X . If X < 6.30, to delay the entry of the
flexible follower, the leader waits until X reaches 6.30. For any X between 6.30 and 11.73,
the leader needs to invest immediately to delay the flexible follower. For X > 11.73, the
entry deterrence strategy is not possible because the market demand is large enough for
both firms to be active. Moreover, XaccD = 8.50 and X
acc
1 = 9.23, which implies the accom-
modation strategy is to invest immediately when X(t) reaches 9.23. XaccD < X
acc
1 makes
XaccD have no meaning for this numerical example as the demand parameter has to reach
the value of Xacc1 to make the follower invest at the same time as the leader.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of V detD (X) and V
acc
D (X) when the flexible follower produces below
capacity right after investment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05,
c = 2, δ = 10.
Figure 3.2 shows the value of the entry deterrence strategy V detD and accommodation
strategy V accD as functions of X , when the flexible follower produces below capacity right
after investment. For Xdet1 < X < X̂ , the entry deterrence strategy is chosen by the leader
and the leader would invest at XdetD = 6.30 with capacity KD(X
det) = 6.67. For X ≥ X̂ ,
because X̂ > Xacc1 , the leader would choose entry accommodation strategy by investing
immediately with capacity level KaccD (X).
• The flexible follower produces up to capacity right after the investment when α ≤
r− c/δ , or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r) and σ ≤ σ̄ .
Similar to the case where the flexible follower produces below capacity right after in-
vestment, given that the leader invests at X , its value function before and after the follower’s
entry can be written as
VD(X ,KD) =
{
B2(KD)Xβ1 + KD(1−γKD)r−α X−
cKD
r X < X
∗
F(KD),





r X ≥ X∗F(KD),
(3.23)
with B2(KD)





according to the value matching condition at the flexible follower’s investment threshold
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X∗F(KD), which is defined by (3.12).
Similar as B1(KD), B2(KD) corrects for the fact that when the follower enters the mar-
ket, i.e. X reaches X∗F(KD), it would put an end to the leader’s monopoly privilege. Thus,
B2(KD) is negative. Because X∗F(KD) increases with KD according to Corollary 3.1, it is
possible for the dedicated leader to delay the entry of flexible follower through the en-
try deterrence strategy by investing KdetD (X) > K̂D(X). Otherwise, the two firms invest
at the same time, implying the leader applies the entry accommodation strategy by in-
vesting KaccD ≤ K̂D(X). This critical size for the leader’s capacity, K̂D(X), can be derived
from (3.12) with the follower’s optimal investment capacity K∗F(X)≡ K∗F(KD(X)) satisfy-
ing (3.11).
The leader’s investment decision under entry deterrence and accommodation strategies,
when the follower produces up to capacity right after investment, are summarised in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose α ≤ r− c/δ , or both r− c/δ < α ≤ δ r2/(c+δ r) and σ ≤ σ̄ .
(a) Entry Deterrence Strategy



















































−δ = 0, (3.26)
where K∗F(0) and X
∗



































−δK∗F(0) = 0. (3.28)
The optimal investment threshold XdetD and the corresponding optimal capacity K
det
D
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if X < XdetD and X
det
D ∈ [Xdet1 ,Xdet2 ]. If XdetD ≤ X < Xdet2 , in order to implement the entry
deterrence strategy, the leader invests immediately at X with capacity KdetD (X) that
satisfies (3.25). The value of the entry deterrence strategy is









(b) Entry Accommodation Strategy
















r −δ = 0. (3.30)




















(1− γKaccD − γK∗F(KaccD ))−
c
r
−δ = 0, (3.31)
if X < XaccD and X
acc
D ≥ Xacc1 . The optimal investment capacity for the entry accommo-
dation strategy is




If X ≥XaccD , in order to implement the entry accommodation strategy, the leader invests
immediately at X and the corresponding capacity KaccD (X) satisfies (3.30). The value
of the entry accommodation strategy is
V accD (X) =N (KaccD (X))Xβ2 +






Similar to the previous case, a numerical example is provided to illustrate how the leader
decides on investment when the follower produces up to capacity right after investment.
Figure 3.3 gives a numerical illustration for K̂D, KdetD , and K
acc
D as functions of X when
the flexible follower produces up to capacity right after investment. For the given parameter
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of K̂D(X), KdetD (X), and K
acc
D (X) when the flexible follower pro-
duces up to capacity right after investment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.02,
σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.






with Xdet1 = 2.70








2 ) = 9.57.
The optimal investment threshold is XdetD = 6.28 and the optimal capacity size is K
det
D =
6.18 if X < 6.28. For the entry accommodation strategy, XaccD = 8.47 and K
acc
D = 6.18 if





implying XaccD has no meaning as the demand parameter has to reach the value of X
acc
1 to
make the follower invest at the same time as the leader. Thus, in order to play the entry
accommodation strategy, the leader waits until X reaches 8.76 and invests immediately.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the values of the entry deterrence strategy V detD (X) and the entry
accommodation strategy V accD (X) as functions of X when the flexible follower produces
up to capacity right after investment. Again, the dedicated leader will consider the entry
deterrence strategy for Xdet1 < X < X̂ and the entry accommodation strategy for X ≥ X̂ . So
to implement the entry deterrence strategy, the leader invests at XdetD = 6.28 with capacity
KdetD = 6.18 if X < X
det
D , and invests immediately at X with capacity K
det
D (X) if X
det
D ≤ X <
X̂ . To implement the entry accommodation strategy, the leader invests immediately at X
when X ≥ X̂ with capacity KaccD (X).
It can be concluded from Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 that the entry accommodation strategy
is not possible for X < Xacc1 , and the entry deterrence strategy is not possible for X > X
det
2 .
When Xacc1 < X < X
det
2 , the strategy that gives higher value will be chosen by the leader.
Huisman and Kort (2015) has shown analytically that Xacc1 < X
det
2 when there is no volume
flexibility for the follower. With Figure 3.5 we check numerically whether this still holds
for a flexible follower. Figure 3.5 shows that departing from the default parameter values
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of V detD (X) and V
acc
D (X) when the flexible follower produces up to
capacity right after investment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.02, σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05,
c = 2, δ = 10.
α = 0.03, σ = 0.2, r = 0.1, c = 2, δ = 10, and γ = 0.05, when changing σ , α , r, c, δ and
γ , Xdet2 is always larger than X
acc




1 also holds for
the setting with follower’s volume flexibility. However, different from Huisman and Kort
(2015), where XaccD < X
acc
1 always holds, the numerical analysis in Figure 3.5 shows that
for significantly small α or δ , it actually holds that XaccD > X
acc
1 . Note that X
acc
D implies that
the market demand should be large enough to accommodate both firms’ entry at the same
time. When α is small or negative, implying that the follower produces up to full capacity
right after investment, a larger market demand is required to accommodate two firms and
it leads to XaccD > X
acc
1 . When δ is small, i.e., it is not expensive to invest, both firms are
encouraged to install larger capacities and a larger XaccD is required to hold both firms in the
market. The above results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. Denote X̂ as
X̂ = min{X |Xacc1 < X < Xdet2 and V accD (X) =V detD (X)}.







D ) if 0≤ X < XdetD ,
KdetD (X) if X
det
D ≤ X < X̂ ,
KaccD (X
acc
D ) or K
det
D (X̂) if X̂ ≤ X < XaccD ,
KaccD (X) if X ≥max{X̂ ,XaccD }.
(3.33)
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XdetD if 0≤ X < XdetD ,
X if XdetD ≤ X < X̂ ,
XaccD or X̂ if X̂ ≤ X < XaccD ,
X if X ≥max{X̂ ,XaccD }.
(3.34)
The optimal capacity level for the leader K∗D(X) and for the flexible follower K
∗
F(X) are
demonstrated in Figure 3.6. For the given parameter values, XdetD = 6.3, X
acc
1 = 8.3671 <
XaccD = 8.3710 < X̂ = 9.2809, and the flexible follower produces up to capacity right after
investment. According to Proposition 3.4, if X < X̂ , the leader chooses the entry deterrence
strategy. Note that for X < XdetD , the leader is waiting to invest. Once level X
det
D is reached,
the leader invests with capacity KdetD (X
det
D ) = 5.7143. Then the follower would wait un-
til X∗F(K
det




D ) = 4.1746. If X
det
D < X ≤ X̂ ,
the leader invests immediately at level X with KdetD (X), and the follower invests later at
X∗F(K
det




D (X)). If X̂ < X < X
acc
D , the investment happens when X reaches
XaccD , and the leader applies the entry accommodation strategy. There is also investment
when X decreases and reaches X̂ , where the leader implements the entry deterrence strat-
egy. If X > max{X̂ ,XaccD }, the leader invests immediately at X with capacity level KaccD (X).
The follower invests at the same time with capacity K∗F(K
acc
D (X)). Figure 3.6 shows that
for the entry deterrence strategy, the leader’s optimal investment capacity increases with
X when X < X̂ . This is because as the demand becomes larger, in order to postpone the
follower’s entry and to prolong the monopoly privilege, the leader needs to install more
capacity. According to Huisman and Kort (2015), when X = X̂ , this overinvestment can be
seen as the difference in K∗D(X) at X̂ , because the entry accommodation strategy capacity
corresponds to the Stackelberg leader’s capacity level. This explains the jump for the firms’
capacities at X̂ . The increase of K∗D for X ≥ X̂ is less dramatic than that for X < X̂ . This
increase is only to reduce the follower’s investment capacity rather than to postpone the
follower’s entry. Correspondingly to the increase in the leader’s optimal capacity levels,
the follower’s optimal investment capacity decreases with X . More specifically, K∗F(X) de-
creases faster for X < X̂ because of the over-investment effect and much slower for X ≥ X̂ .
Figure 3.7 demonstrates the value for the dedicated leader V ∗D(X) and the flexible fol-
lower V ∗F (X). Note that if X < X
det
D , the value of the leader is the value of holding the
option to invest, not the immediate value at the moment of investment as in Huisman and
Kort (2015), thus it is not equal 0. If X ≥ XdetD , then the leader’s value is the value of
immediate investment. The leader switches from the entry deterrence to the entry accom-
modation strategy at X̂ . When X < XdetD , the follower’s value also comes from holding the
option to invest. When XdetD ≤ X < X̂ , the follower expects the leader to play the entry de-
terrence strategy and to invest at X . Then the follower would adjust the investment timing
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of Xacc1 , X
det
2 , and X
acc
D . Default parameter values are α = 0.03,
σ = 0.2, r = 0.1, c = 2, δ = 10, γ = 0.05.















Figure 3.6: Illustration of K∗D(X) and K
∗
F(X) when the flexible follower produces up to
capacity right after investment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05,
c = 2, δ = 10.
accordingly. For the given parameter values in Figure 3.7, the flexible follower does not
invest for X ≤ X̂ . It therefor, holds an option to invest until X rises above X̂ . The kink in
the follower’s value function is because the leader switches from entry deterrence to entry
accommodation strategy, where the follower invests immediately at the same time with the
leader.













Figure 3.7: Illustration of V ∗D(X) and V
∗
F (X) when the flexible follower produces up to
capacity right after investment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05,
c = 2, δ = 10.
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Figure 3.8 demonstrates the optimal capacity levels for the two firms when the fol-
lower produces below capacity right after investment. For given parameter values r = 0.1,
α = 0.03, σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05, c = 2, and δ = 0.5, if X < XdetD , the leader waits until X
reaches XdetD = 4.3050 to implement the entry deterrence strategy. The entry deterrence
strategy will be chosen when X < X̂ = 4.4779. If X ≥ X̂ , the leader chooses the entry
accommodation strategy. However, different from the previous example where XaccD < X̂ ,
here Xacc1 = 4.4072 < X̂ < X
acc
D = 4.8238, implying that the leader chooses the accommo-
dation strategy for X̂ ≤ X < XaccD but waits to invest until XaccD is reached. So the leader is
holding an option to invest in the accommodation strategy. This is shown in Figure 3.8 as

















Figure 3.8: Illustration of K∗D(X) and K
∗
F(X) when the flexible follower produces below
capacity right after investment. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, σ = 0.2, γ = 0.05,
c = 2, δ = 0.5.
Figure 3.9 demonstrates the values of the leader and the follower as functions of X
when the follower produces below capacity right after investment. When X < XdetD , the
leader waits to invest with the entry deterrence strategy capacity. The follower is also





XdetD ≤ X < X̂ , the leader invests immediately at level X with deterrence capacity KdetD (X).
The follower invests later than the leader. When X̂ ≤ X < XaccD , the leader switches to










of the switch of strategies, the leader’s value function has a kink and the follower’s value
function is shown to jump at X̂ . When X ≥ XaccD , the leader invests immediately with the
entry accommodation strategy capacity KaccD (X). The follower also invests at the same time
as the leader with capacity K∗F(K
acc
D (X)).
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of V ∗D(X) and V
∗
F (X) when the flexible follower produces below
capacity right after investment. Parameter values are α = 0.03, σ = 0.2, r = 0.1, c = 2,
δ = 10, γ = 0.05.
3.5 Influence of Flexibility
In order to analyze the influence of the follower’s volume flexibility, the optimal invest-
ment decisions without flexibility are derived in the appendix. By comparing the leader’s
investment decisions with a flexible and with a dedicated follower, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.5. Volume flexibility does not influence the leader’s entry deterrence strat-
egy. Moreover, it also does not influence the leader’s optimal capacity under entry accom-
modation strategy.
In this section, numerical analysis is carried out to investigate how flexibility influences
the leader and follower’s investment decisions. More specifically, it considers the possible
occurrence of each strategy by comparing Xdet1 , X
det
2 , and X
acc
1 . Because the flexibility
influences the investment threshold for the accommodation strategy, the focus is put on
the accommodation strategy, or rather on the switch between the entry deterrence and ac-
commodation strategy. The impact of flexibility on the leader’s accommodation strategy
capacity and option values at this switch is also analyzed. Moreover, this section looks
further at the follower’s optimal investment decisions under leader’s entry deterrence and
accommodation strategies. The follower’s investment thresholds and capacities are com-
pared according to whether the production flexibility is available. The influence of the
flexibility on the follower’s values at the moment of investment is also analyzed.
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3.5.1 Flexibility Influences Dedicated Leader
Though the follower’s flexibility influences neither the leader’s deterrence strategy, nor the
investment capacity under the accommodation strategy, it does influence the possibility to
implement these two strategies. The analysis is focused on the interval [Xdet1 ,X
det
2 ], where
the entry deterrence strategy is considered; and the region in which X ≥ Xacc1 , where the
accommodation strategy is considered.
Figure 3.10 demonstrates that, under entry deterrence strategy, Xdet1 with flexibility is
greater or equal to that without flexibility and Xdet2 with flexibility is smaller or equal to
that without flexibility. Thus the interval to implement entry deterrence strategy shrinks
when the follower is flexible. For the entry accommodation strategy, Xacc1 with flexibility
is smaller than that without flexibility, so the interval to implement entry accommodation
strategy enlarges when the follower is flexible. The changes in the intervals reflect the
tendency for the leader to implement the corresponding strategy. It holds that for the given
parameters, the leader tends to delay the flexible follower’s entry less and is more likely to
choose the accommodation strategy in case of a flexible follower.
Figure 3.11 shows that the dedicated leader’s accommodation strategy threshold is higher
than that without flexibility, because a flexible follower invests more than an inflexible fol-
lower at XaccD and a higher demand is required to choose the accommodation strategy. For
the given parameter values, we have Xacc1 > X
acc
D , which makes the optimal threshold X
acc
D
meaningless as in the case of without flexibility. From Proposition 3.4, the leader does
not necessarily invest at threshold XaccD to apply the entry accommodation. If X̂ ≥ XaccD ,
the leader invests at X̂ , the switch from entry deterrence to accommodation. So for the
accommodation strategy, we further analyze the influence of the follower’s flexibility on
X̂ . In Figure 3.11, it is shown that X̂ > Xacc1 , implying that X̂ is meaningful. Moreover,
X̂ increases with market uncertainty σ . This means that the leader switches to the accom-
modation strategy later in a more volatile market. The intuition is that both the leader and
the follower invest more in case of a larger uncertainty, see also Figure 3.15. Therefore, a
higher demand is required to accommodate the two firms. However, X̂ with flexibility is
smaller than without flexibility, implying that the dedicated leader switches to the accom-
modation strategy earlier when the follower is flexible. This is similar as the findings above
that the accommodation strategy is more likely with a flexible follower. Furthermore, Fig-
ure 3.11 also demonstrates that when switching to the accommodation strategy, the leader
invests less if the follower is flexible. This will be explained in the following subsection.
Next, we check how the follower’s flexibility affects the leader’s value. Figure 3.12
demonstrates the dedicated leader’s value under entry deterrence strategy at investment
threshold XdetD and under accommodation strategy at X̂ , with and without flexibility. For
the entry deterrence strategy, Figure 3.12a shows that the leader’s value at the investment
threshold XdetD with flexibility is smaller or equal to that without flexibility. This is because
60 Chapter 3. Strategic Capacity Investment under Uncertainty with Volume Flexibility

































































Figure 3.10: Illustration of Xdet1 , X
det
2 , and X
acc
1 with and without flexibility. Parameter
values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
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Figure 3.11: Illustration of XaccD , X̂ , and K
acc
D (X̂) with and without flexibility. Parameter
values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
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flexibility does not change the dedicated leader’s investment threshold and capacity under
entry deterrence strategy, but it makes the follower enter the market earlier (see Figure
3.13), which puts an earlier end to the leader’s monopoly privilege. Similar analysis can
be done for the accommodation strategy. The follower’s flexibility makes the leader invest
earlier and less under accommodation strategy. However, as shown in Figure 3.12, the
leader’s values at the moment of investment is larger than that without flexibility under the
accommodation strategy4. This implies that the follower’s flexibility also is good for the
leader when accommodating the flexible follower’s entry. If the leader deters the flexible
follower’s entry, the flexibility decreases its value.



















(a) Entry deterrence strategy.

















(b) Deterrence and accommodation switch.




D ) when investing at the optimal threshold X
det
D ,
and V accD (X̂ ,K
acc
D (X̂)) when investing at level X̂ with and without flexibility. Parameter
values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
3.5.2 Flexibility Influences Flexible Follower
In this subsection, we compare how the flexibility influences the follower’s investment
threshold, capacity, and value when the dedicated leader takes the entry deterrence and
accommodation strategies.
When the leader chooses the entry deterrence strategy, the flexibility allows a flexible
follower to invest with more capacity, as shown in Figure 3.13. This is because the follower
can adjust output levels according to market demand, and invests more anticipating poten-
tial upward demand shocks in the future. According to the analysis of the monopoly case as
in Wen et al. (2017), larger capacity means more investment costs, and the firm invests later
4Note that X̂ is different for the leader depending on the follower’s flexibility. When comparing values at
different X̂s, the comparison should be made at a predetermined point of time, for instance, at X̂ in the flexible
follower situation. The discount factor for the leader’s value with a flexible follower is
(
X̂in f lexible/X̂ f lexible
)β1 ,
where X̂ f lexible stands for the X̂ in the flexible follower situation, and X̂in f lexible stands for the X̂ in the inflex-
ible follower situation.
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D )) under entry deterrence
strategy with and without flexibility. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, γ = 0.05,
c = 2, δ = 10.
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so that the market demand is higher to compensate for the investment costs. However, as
shown in Figure 3.13, this is not the case in the duopoly model. Here, the flexible follower
invests more and invests earlier than the inflexible follower. Twofold reasons are provided.
On one hand, the inflexible follower always produces up to full capacity, even when the
profit is negative for low levels of X . This decreases the optimal investment capacity, and
delays inflexible follower’s investment because of the preference for large market demand.
On the other hand, the flexible follower can invest more because the future output quantity
can adjust to market demand. The flexibility also gives higher values to the follower as
illustrated in Figure 3.13. The higher value is due to the flexibility to avoid overproduction
in case of low demands, and motivates the follower to invest earlier. Besides, the differ-
ence between with and without flexibility increases with σ . This is because for smaller
σ , market uncertainty is low and the flexible follower produces up to capacity right after
investment, so the difference in X∗F(K
det




D ) between with and without flexibil-
ity is relatively small. However, with more market uncertainty, i.e., larger σ , the flexible
follower produces below capacity right after investment and more capacity is put on hold
for future positive demand shocks, so the difference is relatively large.
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D ) with and without flexibility under the entry deterrence
strategy. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
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We can also compare at the moment of the follower’s investment the market price
p(X∗F(K
det















D ), i.e., how much of the capacity is used for pro-
duction . As demonstrated in Figure 3.14, the market price is higher when the inflexible
follower invests. The market price is influenced by both the leader and follower’s output
levels and the market demand. Figure 3.14 shows that when the flexible follower produces
up to capacity for small σ , the output is close to or slightly larger than that of the inflexible
follower at the moment of investment. Because the inflexible follower invests later, the
market demand is larger. These two effects lead to higher instant market prices for the
inflexible follower when it invests, given the same entry deterrence strategy of the leader.
When the flexible follower produces below capacity, the flexible follower’s instant output
gradually falls below the inflexible follower’s output as σ increases. Given the same output
levels from the leader, there is less instant output from the follower. However, the inflex-
ible follower invests much later than the flexible follower, so the market demand is much
higher. Thus, the instant market price when the inflexible follower invests is still higher.
This also leads to higher instant profit flows of the inflexible follower. However, the flex-
ible follower invests earlier than the inflexible follower, if the flexible follower’s value is
“discounted" to the inflexible follower’s investment threshold, as shown in Figure 3.13, the
flexible follower has higher values5. Figure 3.14 also demonstrates that the utilization rate
at the moment of investment is 1 when the flexible follower produces up to capacity, and it
decreases with σ when the flexible follower produces below capacity. The latter result is
consistent with the findings in Hagspiel et al. (2016). The reason is that a higher σ implies
larger market uncertainty, and for a positive market trend α , the firm invests later with
more capacity as shown in Figure 3.13. Although for the output decisions, only current
market demand matters. The investment being delayed implies larger market demand, and
the output also increases with σ . However, as shown in Figure 3.14, the invested capacity
K∗F(K
det




D )), thus the utilization rate decreases with σ .
The dedicated leader switches from deterrence to accommodation strategy at X̂ . Note
that for the accommodation strategy, the follower invests at the same time with the leader,
thus in Figure 3.15 X∗F(K
acc
D (X̂)) is the same as X̂ in Figure 3.11. Figure 3.15 shows that
under the leader’s accommodation strategy, the flexible follower invests earlier and more
than the inflexible follower. The story here is similar to that in the deterrence strategy,
where the flexible follower also invests earlier and more than the inflexible follower, and
has higher value.
Figure 3.16 demonstrates the market price, the follower’s output levels, profit flows
and flexible follower’s utilization rate at the moment of investment when the leader takes
entry accommodation strategy. As shown in Figure 3.16 and unlike that for the entry
5The discount factor is
(
X∗F in f lexible/X
∗
F in f lexible
)β1




D ) for the in-




D ) for the flexible follower.
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D (X̂)), and VF(K
acc
D (X̂)) under the entry
accommodation strategy with and without flexibility. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α =
0.03, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
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deterrence strategy, the market price at the moment of investment when the follower is
flexible, is not always lower than when the follower is inflexible. There are three factors
that affect market prices: the market demand at the moment of investment, the follower’s
output quantity, and the leader’s installed capacity. Because the flexible follower invests
earlier as shown in Figure 3.15, the market demand is smaller. The output qF(KaccD (X))
in Figure 3.16 shows that the flexible follower produces more than an inflexible follower.
Thus, if the leader produces the same output level as in the entry deterrence strategy, the
market price with a flexible follower would be lower than that with an inflexible follower.
However, Figure 3.11 shows that the leader installs smaller capacity when the follower is
flexible. Because the leader always produces up to capacity, this might result in a market
price higher than that with an inflexible follower. For smaller σ , the follower’s profit at the
moment of investment, πF(KaccD (X̂)) is larger when the follower is flexible. Whereas for
larger σ , this profit is larger when the follower is inflexible. The reasons are as follows. For
smaller σ , the price levels at the moment of investment are higher with flexibility, and the
flexible follower is producing more than the inflexible follower. Thus the flexible follower
has larger profit at the moment of investment. However, when σ is large, the price level at
the moment of investment is much higher for the inflexible follower. Though the flexible
follower still produces more than an inflexible follower, the later has higher profit flows at
the moment of investment. Figure 3.16 also demonstrates that when the flexible follower
produces below capacity right after investment, the utilization rate decreases with σ . The
intuition is the same as for the deterrence strategy case.
3.5.3 First Mover Advantage v.s. Technological Advantage
In this subsection, we investigate whether the leader’s first mover advantage can be over-
come by the flexible follower’s technological advantage.
Figure 3.17 compares the leader and the follower’s values for the leader’s entry deter-
rence and accommodation strategy with and without flexibility. The leader always has
higher values than the follower, implying the first mover advantage cannot be leapfrogged
by the volume flexibility advantage. For the duopoly model in this chapter, according to
Corollary 3.1, the optimal installed capacity by the follower decreases with the leader’s in-
stalled capacity size. So this result is supported by Gal-Or (1985). They find that the leader
has higher payoff than the follower if the reaction function of the follower is downward-
sloping. The players are symmetric in Gal-Or’s model. In our model, the players are
asymmetric and time is continuous. The possible reason, why it is more difficult for the
technological advantage to take over the first mover advantage, is that there are benefits to
the leader by the follower’s production technology without sharing costs.
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D (X̂)) with and without flexibility under the entry accommoda-
tion strategy. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
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F)) under the entry de-
terrence strategy, V accD (X̂ ,K
acc
D (X̂)) and VF(K
acc
D (X̂)) under the entry accommodation strat-
egy, with and without flexibility. Parameter values are r = 0.1, α = 0.03, γ = 0.05, c = 2,
δ = 10.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduces volume flexibility into the strategic capacity investment problem
under uncertainty. In the duopoly framework, the follower has technological advantage
over the leader in that the follower can adjust output quantity within the constraint of
installed production capacity, and the leader always produces up to capacity. When making
decisions about investment timing and investment capacity, the leader not only takes into
account the incentives to preempt, but also the influence of the follower’s volume flexibility
on the market price. This is because the flexible follower competes against the dedicated
leader on one hand, and on the other hand makes the market price fluctuate less when there
is demand uncertainty. We show that compared with a dedicated follower, the dedicated
leader is more likely to accommodate the entry of the flexible follower. This is due to
the fact that entry deterrence strategy decreases the leader’s value when the follower is
flexible, and the entry accommodation strategy increases the leader’s value. The leader
does not like to play entry deterrence because volume flexibility enables the follower to
enter the market earlier and thus shortens the leader’s monopoly period. Whereas when
playing the accommodation strategy, two firms enter the market later than that under the
deterrence strategy, so the market demand is larger. In a way, the leader benefits more
from the less fluctuating market prices due to follower’s volume flexibility. Dixit (1980)
proves that in a static setting, entry deterrence is largely ineffective if the leader cannot
commit to producing at full capacity, because the leader facing irrevocable entry finds
it optimal to make an accommodating output reduction. We prove that in a stochastic
dynamic setting, deterring the entry of a flexible follower does not necessarily make the
leader better off, and the leader’s commitment to an output quantity is still ineffective to
deter the follower’s entry. In fact, the leader commits to the same output level under the
deterrence and accommodation strategy, but invests at different timings. The establishment
of the role for uncertainty is also an attempt to answer to Huisman and Kort (2015).
Our model assumes exogenous firm roles and takes the dedicated firm as the leader and
the flexible firm as the follower in the market. We have shown that technology advancement
cannot overtake the first mover advantage in the sense that the dedicated leader has higher
value than the flexible follower. So it might be interesting to see how asymmetric firms
interact with each other strategically in an endogenous firm role setting. Another possible
extension is to investigate other demand structures. Our model assumes multiplicative
demand function. We find the dedicated leader installs monopolistic capacity size for the
entry deterrence and accommodation strategy. This is a strong result. It is worthwhile to
do a robustness check with a different demand function.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Derivations and Proofs
Derivation of L1 (KD,KF) ,M1 (KD,KF) ,M2 (KD), N2 (KD,KF) Let X1 = c/(1− γKD) and
























































































































































































From r > α , r > σ2− α , it follows from Wen et al. (2017) that β1 > 1, β2 < −1,
F(β1) < 0, and F(β2) > 0. Thus, we conclude that L(KD,KF) > 0, M1(KD,KF) < 0,
N(KD,KF)> 0, and M2(KD)< 0 for the duopoly model.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 The optimal investment capacity KF (X ,KD) of the follower max-
imizes VF (X ,KD,KF)−δKF . The analysis is carried out for three different regions.
• Region 1: 0 < X < c/(1− γKD).
In this region, we have









Taking the first order condition with respect to KF gives
c1−β1(1+β1)F(β2)Xβ1
2(β1−β2)
(1−2γKF − γKD)β1−δ = 0. (3.35)
Thus,























Thus, KF(X ,KD) maximizes VF(X ,KF ,KD)−δKF .
• Region 2: c/(1− γKD)≤ X < c/(1− γKD−2γKD).
In this region, we have
VF (X ,KD,KF)−δKF






















4γX (r+α−σ2) −δKF .
Taking the first order condition with respect to KF gives






















• Region 3: X ≥ c/(1− γKD−2γKF).
In this region, we have
VF (X ,KD,KF)−δKF
=N2 (KD,KF)Xβ2 +
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Taking the first order condition with respect to KF yields KF(X ,KD) must satisfy












































with the last step being concluded from the Appendix in Chapter 2.
The optimal investment threshold X∗F (KD) in each region can be derived by the value


















Thus, X∗F (KD) satisfies the implicit equation,








The optimal investment threshold X∗F(KD) satisfies the following equation:
c1−β1
[

















which is equivalent to
δKF = 0. (3.39)
• Region 2
The optimal threshold X∗F(KD) satisfies
− F(β2)c

















































−δKF = 0. (3.40)
• Region 3
The optimal investment threshold X∗F(KD) satisfies
c1−β2
[























KF − γKDKF − γK2F
r−α .














−δKF = 0. (3.41)
Note that in the monopoly case, whether the flexible firm produces up to capacity de-
pends on the economic setting. Next, we are going to examine the conditions for the
flexible follower to produce below and up to capacity.


















It is equivalent to
2δ (β1−β2)< cF(β2)(1+β1), (3.42)
which is the same as in the monopoly case. Furthermore, we can deduce that
2δ (β1−β2)≥ cF(β2)(1+β1) (3.43)
would define Region 3, where the firm produces up to capacity right after investment. The
definitions of Region 2, equation (3.42), and Region 3, equation (3.43), for the flexible
follower firm are the same as that for the monopoly flexible firm in Chapter 2.
Proof of Corollary 3.1
• Region 2
Derive dX∗F(KD)/dKD and check whether the leader’s installed capacity level would



































Comparing (3.44) with the implicit equation that determines the optimal investment
threshold in the corresponding monopoly model, see Chapter 2, we find that X(1−
γKD) replaces X∗ in the corresponding monopoly case. Denote x(KD) =X∗F(KD)(1−
γKD), which is not smaller than c according to the follower’s value function, and





















































First check that whether the coefficient of dX(KD)/dKD equals to 0. This coefficient




















































































































































































































































































There are at most two positive values of x bigger than c that make Y (x(KD)) = 0. If
Y (x(KD)) 6= 0 and for (3.45) to hold, it must be dx(KD)/dKD = 0. If Y (x(KD)) = 0,
















implying that investing in more capacity by the dedicated leader would delay the in-
vestment of the flexible follower. According to (3.9), taking the derivative of K∗F(KD)

































This implies that an increase in the inflexible leader’s investment capacity decreases
the flexible follower’s optimal capacity to invest with.













































F (KD) when the follower
produces below capacity right after the investment. Parameter values are α = 0.04, r = 0.1,
σ = 0.3, γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
Figure 3.18 illustrates how the flexible follower’s optimal investment threshold X∗F(KD),
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F(KD)), and the project value when the firm invests




F(KD)), change with the inflexible leader’s investment
capacity KD when the firm produces below capacity right after the investment. It
illustrates that the increase in the leader’s investment capacity indeed delays the flex-
ible follower’s investment and decreases the capacity with witch the follower enters
the market. In fact, if the leader invests with a capacity that is very close to the
market size, then the flexible follower can be almost kept out of the market.
• Region 3
Check whether the leader’s capacity influences the investment decision of the flex-
ible follower. The investment timing X∗F(KD) and investment capacity K
∗
F(KD) are
determined by (3.11) and (3.12) when the follower produces up to capacity right after




























w(KD) = X∗F(KD)(1− γKD),
z(KD) = X∗F(KD)(1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD)).











For (3.51) to hold, it should be that dz(KD)/dKD = 0, implying z(KD) is a constant.
If dz(KD)/dKD 6= 0, then z(KD) changes with KD, and (3.51) cannot hold for all KD,
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Similar to that (3.51) implies z(KD) is a constant, the fact that (3.54) holds implies






















Thus, for the case that the flexible follower produces up to capacity right after the in-
vestment, the inflexible leader can delay and decrease the investment of the follower
by investing in a larger capacity.
Figure 3.19 illustrates the flexible follower’s optimal investment threshold X∗F(KD),
the optimal investment capacity K∗F(KD), and the project value at the moment of in-
vestment V ∗F (KD) as functions of KD. It confirms that X
∗
F(KD) increases with KD,
while K∗F(KD) and V
∗
F (KD) decrease with KD. Thus, the leader can delay the invest-
ment of the flexible follower. The leader can even prevent the follower entering the
market by investing with a capacity close to the market boundary.
Derivation of L(KD),M1(KD),M2(KD),N (KD) Employing value matching and smooth
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F (KD) when the follower produces
up to capacity right after investment. Parameter values are α = 0.03, r = 0.1, σ = 0.14,
γ = 0.05, c = 2, δ = 10.
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pasting at X1 = c1−γKD and X2 =
c
1−γKD−2γK∗F (KD)























































































































































































































(1− γKD)β1− (1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD))β1
]
. (3.65)
From (3.63), it can be derived that

































































(1− γKD)β2− (1− γKD−2γK∗F(KD))β2
]
. (3.66)
Next, we look at the signs for L(KD),M1(KD),M2(KD), andN (KD). In order to do this,
we first check the signs of (β−1)/(r−α)−β/r = αβ−rr(r−α) for β = β1 and β = β2. If α ≥ 0,
then αβ2− r < 0 because β2 < 0. If α < 0, then




















with 12 − ασ2 −
r





































we get αβ2− r < 0. So, β2−1r−α −
β2
r < 0.
If α ≤ 0, then αβ1− r < 0. If α > 0, then




















with 12 − ασ2 −
r








































we get αβ1− r < 0. So, β1−1r−α −
β1
r < 0.





Proof of Negative B1(KD) Before the derivation of the dedicated leader’s optimal invest-
ment capacity in the entry deterrence and accommodation strategies, we first look at the
















































































For X∗F(KD)/X1(KD) and X
∗

































This implies that X∗F(KD)/X1(KD) and X
∗
F(KD)/X2(KD) are constants and do not change























































































































where X∗ satisfies (3.67). Next, we show F(X∗) is negative numerically. The demon-
stration is shown in Figure 3.20. Note that γ does not influence F(X∗), so the numerical
analysis is just about the influence of α , σ , r, c, and δ . The default parameter values are
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α = 0.05, r = 0.1, σ = 0.2, c = 2, δ = 10. Some combination of parameter values does
not make the flexible follower produce below capacity right after investment. After ruling
out these combinations, F(X∗) changing with parameters is illustrated in Figure 3.20. The
numerical analysis confirms that B1(KD) is negative when the flexible follower produces
below capacity right after investment. In the following analysis, we will take B1(KD) as
negative.



















































Figure 3.20: Illustration of negative F(X∗) changing with α , σ , r, c, and δ . Default
parameter values are α = 0.05, r = 0.1, σ = 0.2, c = 2, δ = 10.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2 In order to get the optimal investment decisions for the dedicated
leader, we first calculate the first derivative of B1(KD) with respect of KD. First,M1(KD)







































With dK∗F(KD)/dKD and dX
∗



















































































































































































Next, we analyse the entry deterrence and accommodation strategies for the dedicated
leader, which include the optimal investment capacities and optimal investment thresholds.
1. Entry Deterrence Strategy
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The entry deterrence strategy cannot happen when KdetD (X) < K̂D(X), which yields






2 ) satisfying (3.13) and (3.68). This is because the
demand is high enough for the follower to invest immediately to enter the market.






































−δ = 0. (3.69)
Thus, the entry deterrence strategy is only possible when X ∈ (Xdet1 ,Xdet2 ). Suppose
the investment threshold of the dedicated leader is Xdet(KD) if the follower invests
with capacity KD in the entry deterrence strategy. The leader’s value function before





A(KD)Xβ1 X < Xdet(KD),
B1(KD)Xβ1 + KD(1−γKD)r−α X−
cKD
r X




2r X ≥ X∗F(KD).
(3.70)
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions to determine Xdet(KD) are





















Substituting Xdet(KD) into (3.68), the optimal investment capacity KdetD and invest-
ment threshold Xdet(KdetD ) can be derived as












2. Entry Accommodation Strategy























































































−δ = 0. (3.72)
The entry accommodation strategy only happens when X ≥ X∗F(KD), implying that
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the market demand is large enough to allow both the dedicated leader and the flexible













1 ) satisfy (3.72) and (3.13). Suppose the
dedicated leader invests at Xacc(KD) when the capacity level is KD in the entry ac-










2r X ≥ X∗F(KD)≥ Xacc(KD).
(3.73)
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions to determine Xacc(KD) are






β1A(KD)Xβ1−1 = β1M1(KD)Xβ1−1 +β2M2(KD)Xβ2−1 +
KD(1− γKD)
2(r−α) .
Thus, the investment capacity KaccD (X
acc) and investment threshold Xacc(KaccD ) sat-






−β1δKD = 0. (3.74)










































Solving these equations, we can get







































































































Proof of Negative B2(KD) When the flexible follower produces up to capacity right after
investment, we have













































































































Similar to the case that flexible follower produces below capacity right after investment,
X∗F(KD)/X1(KD) and X
∗













Let X∗F(0) = X
∗ and X2(0) = 1− 2γK∗, with X∗ as the optimal investment threshold and
K∗ as the optimal capacity in the monopoly case where the firm produces up to capacity











































B2(KD) is intuitively negative. However, it is too complicated to show this analytically.
So we try to show it is negative numerically to verify the conjecture. Figure 3.21 demon-
strates G(X∗,K∗) changing with parameters. The default parameter values are given as
α = 0.02, r = 0.1, σ = 0.2, c = 2, δ = 10, and γ = 0.05. Some combination of parameter
values does not define the case that the follower produces up to capacity right after invest-
ment. After ruling out such combinations, the negative G(X∗,K∗) is illustrated in Figure
3.21. This confirms the conjecture that B2(KD) is negative. So in the following analysis,
we assume negative B2(KD).
Proof of Proposition 3.3 We start with the derivative of B2(KD) with respect to KD,
where K∗F(KD) and X
∗
F(KD) are defined by (3.11) and (3.12), and dK
∗
F(KD)/dKD and











































































































































Figure 3.21: Illustration of negative G(X∗,K∗) changing with α , σ , r, c, δ , and γ . Default















































































1. Entry Deterrence Strategy























The entry deterrence strategy cannot happen if KdetD (X) < K̂D(X). If we assume
that the dedicated leader invests at X , then the deterrence strategy is only possible










D ) satisfy (3.11), (3.12), and (3.75),
with X∗F(K
det
D ) = X
det
2 . Similar to the case that the flexible follower produces below
capacity right after investment, the deterrence strategy is not possible if KdetD < 0,
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−δ = 0, (3.76)
where K∗F(0) and X
∗
F(0) satisfy (3.11) and (3.12). Thus, the entry deterrence strategy






. If the leader applies the entry deterrence strategy






A(KD)Xβ1 X < Xdet(KD),
B2(KD)Xβ1 + KD(1−γKD)r−α X−
cKD
r X
det(KD)≤ X < X∗F(KD),





r X ≥ X∗F(KD).
(3.77)
For a given capacity level KD, from value matching and smooth pasting at Xdet(KD),
Xdet(KD) must satisfy






β1A(KD)Xβ1−1 = β1B2(KD)Xβ1−1 +
KD(1− γKD)
r−α .










det(KdetD ) satisfy (3.75), thus the optimal investment capacity K
det
D and
investment threshold Xdet(KdetD ) are












2. Entry Accommodation Strategy
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Thus, the investment capacity by the dedicated leader KaccD (X) for a given level of X































The entry accommodation strategy only happens when the market has grown large















D ) satisfy (3.11), (3.12), and (3.79). Suppose the
dedicated leader uses the entry accommodation strategy and invests at Xacc(KD) with





A(KD)Xβ1 X < Xacc(KD),





r X ≥ X∗F(KD)≥ Xacc(KD).
(3.80)
From value matching and smooth pasting, we get that the investment threshold
Xacc(KD) satisfies






β1A(KD)Xβ1−1 = β2N (KD)Xβ2−1 +
KD(1− γKD− γK∗F(KD))
r−α .







































































it follows that the optimal investment capacity is




Proof of Proposition 3.4 Given in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3.5 When there is no flexibility, the leader’s entry deterrence and en-
try accommodation strategy can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. When the follower is flexible,













regardless of whether the follower produces below or up to capacity right after investment.
This is the same as the the leader’s entry deterrence strategy when there is no flexibility.
From Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 3.3, it also holds that the leader’s investment capacity
under entry accommodation strategy is KaccD =
1
(β+1)γ , regardless of whether the follower
produces below or up to capacity right after investment. This capacity level is the same as
that when there is no flexibility.
3.7.2 No Flexibility
This section analyzes what the follower and leader’s decisions are when there is no flexi-
bility. It means that both firms would always produce up to full capacity. For the follower,
given that the leader invests and always produces KD and the follower invests and always
produces KF , the profit flow at time t equals
πF(t) = (X(t)(1− γ (KD +KF))− c)KF .
Here, we do not allow production suspension. So for a low level X , i.e., X (1− γ(KD +KF))<
c, the firms may have negative profit flows. Given the initial geometric Brownian motion
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Before the investment, the follower holds an option to invest. Suppose the option value is
VF(X ,KD) = AF(KL)Xβ1.
According to value matching and smooth pasting, the investment threshold XF(KD,KF)





































If X∗F(KD) ≤ X(0), then the follower would invest immediately at t = 0 with capacity
K∗F(X(0),KD).
For the leader, to deter or accommodate the entry of the follower would be dependent












Entry Deterrence Strategy If the leader invests a capacity larger than K̂D(X), then the
follower invests later. However, if the leader invests a capacity not larger than K̂D(X), then
the follower invests at the same time with the leader. Suppose the investment threshold
is XdetD (KD) when investing capacity KD, then the leader’s value under entry deterrence
















r if X ≥ X∗F(KD).


























Suppose the leader invests at X , then the investment capacity under the deterrence strategy,
KdetD (X), satisfies
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The corresponding value for the leader’s entry deterrence strategy is



























Substitute (3.89) into (3.87) gives





































Moreover, the entry deterrence strategy can not happen for
0≤ K̂D(X)< KdetD ,
i.e.,



























−δ = 0. (3.90)
If XdetD ≤X , then the deterrence strategy is implemented immediately with capacity KdetD (X)
satisfying (3.87).
Entry Accommodation Strategy Under the entry accommodation strategy, the follower
invests at the same time as the leader. Suppose the investment threshold is XaccD (KD) when












2 if X ≥ XaccD (KD).












The accommodation strategy can only be chosen when KaccD (X) ≤ K̂D(X), which means
that it is only possible when








Moreover, the value matching and smoothing pasting conditions yield that for the given
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Note that Xacc1 > X
acc
D . This means that the leader implements the accommodation strategy




































3.7.3 Additional Proof: Negative Second Order Derivatives
Producing below capacity right after investment
Proof of negative second order partial derivative under the entry deterrence strategy
Under the entry deterrence strategy when the follower produces below capacity right after
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investment, the second order partial derivative of V (X ,KD)−δKD with respect to KD is
∂ 2[V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D
=

































The third order derivative with respect to KD is

























From the third order partial derivative, it follows that the second order derivative decreases
for KD < 3/(γ + γβ1) and increases for KD > 3/(γ + γβ1). Next, we try to show that
∂ 2
∂K2D
[V (KD,X)−δKD] is negative when KD = 0 and KD = 1/γ . Since
∂ 2 [V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D

















































































































































Under the entry deterrence strategy, we have inequality relation
c
1−2γK∗F(0)










































































































































































The default parameter values are α = 0.05, r = 0.1, σ = 0.2, c = 2, δ = 10, and γ = 0.05.
Note that G does not depend on γ , this is because from the monopolistic firm’s investment











Thus, (3.91) can be written as







































Figure 3.22 shows that (3.91) holds for the change in the corresponding parameter. So, we




We then need to show that limKD→1/γ
∂ 2[V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D
< 0. First, note that
lim
KD→1/γ













































































































Figure 3.22: Illustration of G > 0. Default parameter values are α = 0.05, r = 0.1, σ = 0.2,
c = 2, δ = 10.
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If β1 < 2, then lim
KD→1/γ





































from B1(KD) < 0 , it can be concluded that limKD→1/γ
∂ 2[V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D
→−∞. If β1 = 2,
then it still holds that limKD→1/γ
∂ 2[V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D
< 0. If β1 > 2, then X
∗2−β1
F (KD)→ 0 if
KD→ 1/γ , and limKD→1/γ
∂ 2[V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D





[V (X ,KD)−δKD]≤ 0.
Proof of negative second order partial derivative under the entry accommodation
strategy Under the entry accommodation strategy when the follower produces below ca-
pacity right after investment, the second order partial derivative of V (X ,KD)− δKD with
respect to KD is
∂ 2[V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D
=






































If 2− γKD−β1γKD ≥ 0, fromM1(KD)> 0, it follows that
∂ 2
∂K2D
[V (X ,KD)−δKD]< 0.
If 2− γKD−β1γKD < 0, i.e., 2γ(1+β1) < KD <
1
γ , this means that KD is relative large. Let’s
see whether the entry accommodation strategy is possible in this case. First notice that, in
this case, we have















Next, we show that β1 ≤ 3, so that 1−2γKD2(r−α) < 0. In the next, numerical analysis will be
carried out to show that β1 < 3. The default parameter values we use are α = 0.05, r = 0.1,
σ = 0.2, c = 2, δ = 10, and γ = 0.05. Since β1 is only changing with r, α , and σ , Figure
3.23 shows β1 as functions of r, α , and σ . The figure shows that β1 is smaller than 3.













So, this subcase does not give admissible entry accommodation capacity.
Overall, if there is an admissible solution such that it is not bigger than 2(1+β1)γ , then it
would maximise VD(X ,KD)−δKD.
Producing up to capacity right after investment
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Figure 3.23: Illustration of β1 smaller than 3. Default parameter values are α = 0.05,
r = 0.1, σ = 0.2.
3.7. Appendix 117
Proof of negative second order partial derivative under the entry deterrence strategy
Under the entry deterrence strategy when the follower produces up to capacity right after

























Because B2(KD) is negative, the second order derivative decreases for 0 < KD < 3(1+β1)γ
and increases for 3(1+β1)γ <KD <
1
γ . Similar to the proof of negative second order derivative
for the deterrence strategy when the flexible follower produces below capacity right after
















< 0. First note that in this case, we have
X1(0) = c < X2(0) =
c
1−2γK∗F(0)






























































































In Figure 3.24, we show numerically that G is not positive over α , σ , r, c, δ , and γ . The
default parameter values are α = 0.02, r = 0.1, σ = 0.2, c = 2, δ = 10, and γ = 0.05.
We also need to show limKD→1/γ
∂ 2[VD(KD,X)−δKD]
∂K2D






















































































































Figure 3.24: Illustration of negative G. Default parameter values are α = 0.02, r = 0.1,
σ = 0.2, c = 2, δ = 10, γ = 0.05.
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Proof of negative second order partial derivative under the entry accommodation
strategy Under the entry accommodation strategy when the follower produces up to ca-



































(1− γKD)(1− γKD− γK∗F(KD))




























































The positive third order derivative implies that the second order derivative of VD(X ,KD)−
δKD increases for all KD ∈ [0,1/γ). If it can be shown that the second order partial deriva-
tive is negative when KD approaches 1/γ , then it holds on the interval of [0,1/γ) that














































































∂ 2[V (X ,KD)−δKD]
∂K2D
< 0.
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In conclusion, it follows that for all 0≤ KD < 1/γ ,




Subsidized Capacity Investment under Uncertainty
This chapter studies how the subsidy support, e.g. price support and reimbursed invest-
ment cost support, affects the investment decision of a monopoly firm under uncertainty
and analyzes the implications for social welfare. The analytical results show that the un-
conditional, i.e., subsidy support that is introduced from the beginning, makes the firm
invest earlier. Under a linear demand structure, the unconditional subsidy cannot align the
firm’s investment decision to the social optimal one. However, a conditional subsidy, i.e.,
subsidy support introduced at the social optimal investment threshold, can align the two
decisions. For a non-linear demand structure, it is possible for the unconditional subsidy to
make the firm invest according to the social optimum. When the investment decisions are
aligned, the firm’s investment leads to the first-best outcome.
4.1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, many public owned functions and businesses have been decentralized,
e.g. postal services, banking, airlines, telecommunication, and public infrastructures. The
government owns many resources such as water, land, and mineral. Decentralization means
the private firms have the right to invest, produce, and make profit from such resources, for
example, port investment, agriculture investment, green energy investment, and so on. The
privatization is believed to be more efficient and effective in decision making because of the
quicker reaction to unanticipated market changes. However, after the privatization, firms
prioritize profit maximization and do not consider the social optimal goals when making
decisions. This is different from the goal of the social planner, which is to achieve social
optimality. For instance, energy producers that use fossil fuel and emit greenhouse gases
do not take into account environmental damage (Eichner and Runkel, 2014), whereas the
regulator such as the E.U. parliament, has the purpose to fulfill the emissions reduction
commitment and encourage the investments of renewable energy. In risky environments it
123
124 Chapter 4. Subsidized Capacity Investment under Uncertainty
has been argued that a firm tends to postpone investment (see e.g., McDonald and Siegel
(1986)). According toDobbs (2004), the level of investment in capacity might also be
constrained by the firm. For example, an electricity producer might hesitate to invest in
renewable technology due to high investment costs compared to the fossil fuels. This
implies that the energy market has less incentive to deliver the desired level of renewable
investment. This difference in objectives and investment strategies between the profit and
welfare maximizers poses a coordination problem and requires governmental regulation
(Rodrik, 1992).
In a market with uncertain future demand, the firm is constantly forecasting demand
and balancing the value of investing now and delaying investments. Thus, the real options
approach is used to analyze the investment decisions. Several literatures have studied to use
price regulation such as the price cap to regulate the delayed investment under uncertainty.
For instance, Dobbs (2004) argues that the first-best outcome cannot be reached as price
cap is used for two goals: optimal investment ex-ante and optimal post-investment pricing.
Building on Dobbs (2004), Evans and Guthrie (2012) show that the price cap should be
lowered under scale economics where grouping investments across time is cost efficient.
By contrast, Willems and Zwart (2017) consider constant returns to scale where it is not
optimal to group investments. By assuming asymmetric information on investment costs,
Willems and Zwart (2017) study the optimal mechanism where a revenue tax increases
with the level of the price cap. In this chapter, we study the policy instrument of subsidy,
rather than price cap.
Subsidy support is a very common policy instrument in the fields of agriculture and
green energy. For agriculture in developing economies, there are input subsidies, which are
implemented as price subsidies accessible to producers according to Chirwa and Dorward
(2013). One example is the Indian fertilizer subsidy in order to encourage the domestic
production of fertilizer and to increase its use. To accomplish these two objectives, India
introduced the RPS (Retention Price Subsidy) scheme in 1977, where the difference be-
tween retail price and retention price (adjusted for freight and dealer’s margin) was paid
back to the manufactures as a subsidy (Sharma and Thaker, 2010). Under the RPS, the
production cost plus 12% profit is covered by the subsidy. Later on, RPS was criticized for
being inefficient to motivate the producers to decrease production costs and was replaced
by NPS (New Pricing Scheme) in 2003. Under the new system, the producer receives a set
amount based on the age of the production plant and the amount of feedstock used.
In the green energy field, the subsidy support can take many forms such as feed-in pre-
miums, reimbursed investment costs, feed-in tariffs, tradable green certificates, and quota
obligations. In this research work, two kinds of price support will be discussed: flexible
and fixed price support. Under flexible price support, the producer receives a payment
proportional to the market price for every product sold to the consumer, like 12% for in-
stance in India’s RPS scheme. Under the fixed price support, the producer receives a fixed
payment for every product sold to the consumer that is independent of the market price,
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like the subsidy described in India’s NPS scheme. In the green energy field, the fixed price
support may take the form as the feed-in premium subsidy.
This research studies how different kinds of subsidy support affect the profit maximizing
firm’s investment timing and size, and whether it is possible to align the firm’s investment
decisions to the social optimal ones. Besides the non-linear demand structure used in the
price cap literatures, this chapter considers also the linear demand structure. More specifi-
cally, we consider two kinds of demand shocks for the linear demand: additive (Kulatilaka
and Perotti, 1998; Aguerrevere, 2003; Hagspiel et al., 2016) and multiplicative (Grenadier,
2000; Huisman and Kort, 2015) demand shocks. We show that the subsidy policies intro-
duced from the beginning make the firm invest earlier and invest less. Moreover, we find
that there exists a conditional subsidy to introduce the subsidy support at the social opti-
mal investment timing to align the firm’s optimal investment decision to the social optimal
one. For the non-linear demand structure, if the demand is iso-elastic as in Aguerrevere
(2009) and Novy-Marx (2007), the influence of the subsidy on the firm’s investment deci-
sion depends on the subsidy rate. It is possible to align the firm’s investment decision to
the social optimal decision if subsidies are introduced from the beginning, or at the social
optimal investment timing. For both demand structures, the subsidies that align firm’s and
social optimal investment decision yield the social optimal surplus. To simplify the analy-
sis, we do not consider the efficiency loss in collecting taxes and the allocation of taxation
as subsidies.
Several research papers have already shed light on investment decisions under policy
schemes in the framework of real options. For the policy scheme that will prevail once
being chosen, Pennings (2000) studies the taxation and investment subsidy to stimulate
the instant investment, i.e., the waiting time is zero. Hassett and Metcalf (1999) consider
the uncertainty in the tax policy, such as the U.S. investment tax credits that have been
changed on many occasions since being introduce in 1964, and show that for a relatively
low tax rate, more uncertainty in tax policy speeds up irreversible investment because the
firm inclines to invest at a low tax rate. This chapter focuses on the subsidized investment
and the corresponding welfare analysis, rather than on the taxation.
Most of the existing research concerning policy schemes focuses on green investment
and takes the subsidy payments as a volatile process. Up to our best knowledge, those
papers only study the investment decisions from the perspective of the producer and con-
siders mainly the investment timing. For example, Boomsma et al. (2012) assume that the
geometric Brownian motion governs the capital cost, electricity prices, and subsidy pay-
ments. The support schemes considered include feed-in tariff, flexible price premium, and
renewable energy certificates. The three support schemes differ at how much risk the firm
is exposed to the market. This is different from our research, where the price volatility is
the only risk in the market. Besides the investment timing, we also consider the influence
of subsidies on the firm’s optimal investment capacity. Moreover, we study the optimal
subsidy schemes to make the firm invest in a social optimal way.
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Current literatures on subsidy mainly consider the uncertainty about introduction or re-
traction of subsidy schemes. Boomsma and Linnerud (2015) also examine how the market
risk and the policy risk of retractable support schemes affect the investment timing. They
find that the risk of subsidy termination speeds up the investment. This result is also sup-
ported by Adkins and Paxson (2015). They provide the intuition that the firm wants to
catch the subsidy before it is gone. Similarly, future provision of permanent subsidy de-
lays investment because the firm wants to wait for the subsidy. This influence of subsidy
retraction and provision is further studied by Chronopoulos et al. (2016). Besides the in-
vestment timing, they also consider the influence of policy uncertainty on the investment
capacity/size. They find that the future subsidy retraction lowers the amount of installed
capacity, and the future subsidy provision raises the incentive to install a larger capacity. In
this research, we also consider both investment timing and capacity. Rather than the policy
uncertainty, the focus is on the welfare analysis of the investment subsidy and the optimal
subsidy policies to align the firm’s investment decision to the social optimal investment
decision.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the profit and welfare maxi-
mizers’ investment problems and the subsidy support. In Section 4.3 we derive the optimal
subsidy policy to align the firm’s and social optimal investment decisions, and compare
the optimal subsidy support schemes. Section 4.4 studies the optimal subsidy policies and
compares them for different demand structures. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model Setup
Consider a continuous-time and one-time irreversible capacity investment problem. In-
vestor needs to decide on the investment timing and investment capacity. There is no
depreciation of capacity and no production costs and the marginal cost of investment is
constant, δ > 0. Once a capacity K is installed, K will be sold in the market at a price
p(X(t),K). {X(t)|t ≥ 0} is the demand shift parameter and satisfies a geometric Brownian
motion,
dX (t) = µX (t)dt +σX (t)dω (t) , (4.1)
in which µ is the drift parameter, dω (t) is the increment of a Wiener process, and σ >
0 is the volatility parameter. The discount rate is r and we assume r > µ . The instant
producer surplus is profit flow p(X(t),K)K. The instant consumer surplus is denoted as
cs(X(t),K). A regulator’s objective is to maximize the producer and consumer surplus
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This yields the social optimal investment decision (X∗W ,K
∗
W ) with X
∗
W the social optimal
investment threshold that triggers investing K∗W once it is reached. Hence, the social opti-
mal investment time T is the first time that the stochastic process, which starts at X(0) at
time zero, reaches X∗W . The profit maximizer, the firm, has the objective to maximize the













The solution gives firm’s optimal investment decision as (X∗,K∗). X∗ is the optimal in-
vestment threshold and triggers the firm to invest K∗ once being reached. Comparing (4.2)
and (4.3), it can be concluded that firm’s investment decision is not totally aligned with
social optimal investment decision such that X∗ = X∗W and K
∗ = K∗W both hold. This dis-
tortion implies that firm’s optimal investment decision generates externality and does not
lead to first-best outcome. In order to align these two investment decisions, the regulator
needs to make the firm internalize this externality when deciding on investment. Because
the difference between the two objectives, (4.2) and (4.3), is consumer surplus, a possi-
ble regulation is to propose a contract that specifies a monetary transfer, e.g., a subsidy,
to remunerate the firm. Such subsidy scheme can be a subsidy flow s(X(t),K) that sat-
isfies s(X(t),K) = cs(X(t),K), or a lump sum subsidy transfer s(X ,K) to the firm when
investing at level X with capacity K. Let S(X ,K) and CS(X ,K) be the discounted expected
subsidy and consumer surplus. For both subsidy flow and lump sum subsidy, when firm’s

















(4.4) and (4.5) are straightforward outcomes from the maximization of social surplus and
producer surplus when the firm internalizes the subsidy. After subsidy, the producer surplus
from profit flow is equal to the producer surplus in (4.2). The producer surplus from subsidy
is equal to subsidy costs. Consumer surplus after subsidy has the same value as in (4.2). In
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this way, social surplus reaches the first-best level after subsidy.
Denote a subsidy flow as s(X(t),K, s̃) for given capacity level K and subsidy rate pa-
rameter s̃ ≥ 0. This flow can be implemented in many forms. It can be a flexible price
support (a proportional add-on to the market price), i.e., s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃P(X(t),K)K, or
a fixed price support (a fixed add-on to the market price), i.e., s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K. These
two subsidy flows influence firm’s profit flow directly because of their relation to mar-
ket prices. Denote a lump sum subsidy as s(K, s̃). It can be reimbursed investment cost
(a one time remuneration transfer as a fraction of investment costs), i.e., s(K, s̃) = s̃δK.
Let the expected discounted producer surplus be V (X ,K, s̃) for the given geometric Brow-
nian motion level X(0) = X and investment capacity K. The firm’s optimal investment
decision is (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)) after subsidy s̃. The corresponding expected social surplus is
W (s̃) = W (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃), s̃). When s̃∗ maximizes W (s̃) and yields the firm’s optimal de-
cision such that(X∗(s̃∗),K∗(s̃∗)) = (X∗W ,K
∗
W ), then subsidy scheme s̃
∗ is optimal. In the
following analysis, we focus on the feasibility of these implementations for some specific
demand structures.
4.3 Linear Demand
Let the inverse linear demand function for a given investment capacity K ≥ 0 be
p(t) =α[X(t)−ηK]+ (1−α)[X(t)(1−ηK)]
=X(t)−ηK (α +(1−α)X(t)) , 0≤ α ≤ 1, η > 0
This demand function combines two types of demand shocks: additive demand shocks
X(t)−ηK and multiplicative demand shocks X(t)(1−ηK). The additive demand shocks
have a weight of α . Besides r > µ , it is assumed that r > 2µ +σ2 holds as in Chapters
2 and 3. For additive demand structure, the market size increases when firm waits for a
higher demand level to invest. The additive demand structure corresponds to markets where
there is no obvious cap on market size. The multiplicative demand structure is restricted
by market size, and it corresponds to a market where the amount of potential customers
is limited. An example for multiplicative demand structure is the market of agricultural
machines, see Boonman (2014), where the amount of acres of farmlands and the number
of farmers are limited. This results in an upper bound of demand.
For the given linear demand function, this section first explores the first-best outcome,
where the social planner decides about when and how much to invest. This provides a
benchmark for the policy regulator to regulate the monopoly firm. Then the firm’s opti-
mal investment decision (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)) is analyzed under monetary subsidy. The analysis
focuses specifically on the influence of subsidy on the firm’s investment decision, which
4.3. Linear Demand 129
provides insights on the efficiency of subsidy regulation. Moreover, this section discusses
the best performance for unconditional subsidy that is implemented from the beginning
and for conditional subsidy that is implemented at some specific demand level.
4.3.1 First-best benchmark
The social planner’s maximization problem is described by (4.2). To get a more specific
objective function, we first calculate the discounted consumer and producer surplus sepa-









Given X(0) = X , the expected discounted consumer surplus is equal to






















For a given X , the consumer surplus increases with investment capacity K. This is because
more capacity yields a lower market price since the firm always produces up to full capac-
ity. For a given amount of investment capacity K, the consumer surplus increases with X .
The reason is that a higher level X implies a larger market demand. The highest price that
consumers are willing to pay increases. The expected producer surplus is equal to the value
of the firm, which is the discounted profit flow minus the investment cost. For a given K,









The producer surplus increases with X for given K because a larger demand implies a
higher market price level, which increases firm’s profit flows. The expected social surplus
given at X(0) = X is given by
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From the discounted social welfare function, we can derive the social optimal investment
decision as being summarized in the following proposition. The proof can be found in
Appendix.
Proposition 4.1. The social optimal investment threshold X∗W and the social optimal in-







−2δ = 0 (4.6)
and


















Next we carry out some further analysis on the social optimal investment decision
(X∗W ,K
∗
W ). First, according to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) it holds that
∂β
∂σ < 0 and
∂β
∂ µ < 0.
From equations (4.6) and (4.7), it can be derived that ∂X
∗
W
∂β < 0 and
∂K∗W
∂β < 0. Thus, like the
standard real options result for firm’s investment decision by Huisman and Kort (2015),
we conclude that the increase of uncertainty, that is, a larger value of σ , raises both X∗W
and K∗W . It implies that the social optimal investment is delayed with a greater volatility,
which leads to the adoption of a larger project. This result shows that volatility influences
social planner’s investment decision in the same way as it influences the firm’s investment
decision. Moreover, the increase in drift rate parameter, i.e., a larger value of µ , raises
X∗W and K
∗
W as well. The implication is that the social planner delays and takes on a larger
project upon investment when market grows faster. This is due to the fact that future market
demand is taken into consideration when making investment decisions. A faster growing
market yields a higher demand in the future. Thus, more capacity is needed to satisfy such
demand. It delays investment because of the prolonged waiting for a larger market demand
to be reached.
4.3.2 Subsidized Profit Maximization Investment
As mentioned above, we study monopoly firm’s investment decision under subsidy reg-
ulation. More specifically, we get the insight of how subsidy influences firm’s optimal
investment decision, in order to come up with a subsidy that can achieve either the first-
best or the second-best outcome. For the given linear demand function and subsidy flow
scheme s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, the firm internalizes the subsidy remuneration into
the decision making. Substitute the price in firm’s objective function (4.3) with subsidized
price (1+ s̃)p(X(t),K). For a given capacity K and X(0) = X , the firm’s value function is
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equal to










From this value function of the monopoly firm, we can derive the firm’s optimal investment
decision and the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. Given subsidy flow s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, the optimal investment















(β +1)(1−α)ηK +α(β −2)ηK− rδ
1+ s̃
= 0. (4.10)
First note that when there is no subsidy, e.g., s̃ = 0, we get the monopoly invest-
ment decision (X∗(0),K∗(0)). By comparing with the social optimal investment decision
(X∗W ,K
∗
W ), it holds that X
∗(0) = X∗W and K
∗(0) = K∗W/2. This indicates that when there is
no subsidy under linear demand, the firm and the welfare maximizer have the same invest-
ment threshold, but the social optimal investment capacity is twice of the firm’s capacity.
This result is consistent with the finding by Huisman and Kort (2015), where linear demand
is considered as well. We then study the influence of subsidy on firm’s optimal investment,
which is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Subsidy flow, s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, makes the firm invest earlier
and less. Unconditional subsidy cannot align firm’s investment decision to the social opti-
mal investment decision.
Subsidy motivates the firm to invest earlier because monetary transfer increases the
firm’s expected value, which provides an incentive for the firm to enter the market earlier,
when market demand is smaller. This leads to a smaller capacity being invested under
subsidy regulation. Because firm’s investment capacity without subsidy is already only
half of the social optimal capacity, subsidy regulations makes firm invest less than half
of the social optimal capacity, and thus deviate from the social optimal decision. So the
unconditional subsidy cannot align profit and welfare maximizer’s investment decisions.
Another insight is that it is difficult to align two decision variables with just one subsidy rate
parameter s̃ in unconditional subsidy regulation. This is because both decision variables,
X∗(s̃) and K∗(s̃), are changing with s̃. Intuitively, two parameters and a more complicated
subsidy regulation scheme will be needed. Next, we check another subsidy flow with one
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parameter as well, s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K and s̃ < rδ . This unconditional subsidy regulation
makes the firm invest in the way as described by the following proposition. The firm’s
value function V (X ,K, s̃) and the proof of the proposition can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 4.3. Subsidy flow s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K makes the firm invest at threshold X∗(s̃)












2α(1−α)η2K2 +(β +1)(1−α)(rδ − s̃)ηK +α(β −2)ηK− (rδ − s̃) = 0.
Similar to the subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K, we have dK∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0 and dX∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0,
implying subsidy flow s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K influences firm’s investment decision in the same
way and cannot achieve the first best if it is unconditional, i.e., implemented at Brown-
ian motion level X(0) < X∗. For the lump sum subsidy transfer, it works the same as
s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K as long as its lump sum subsidy rate is s̃/(rδ ).
4.3.3 Second-best outcome for unconditional subsidy
Because unconditional subsidy does not yield the first-best outcome, we want to find out
the second-best outcome that can be achieved by subsidy regulation. Given the firm has
invested at threshold X∗(s̃) with capacity K∗(s̃), the expected social surplus is equal to











Because X∗(s̃)< X∗(0) for s̃ > 0, W (s̃) needs to be compared at a predetermined point in
time such as X∗(0) with a stochastic discount factor (X∗(0)/X∗(s̃))β .The optimal subsidy



































W (s̃) decreases1 with s̃. s̃∗ = 0 implies that the second-best outcome
for unconditional subsidy is to implement no subsidy.





W (s̃) > 0. This implies an infinite amount of
monetary transfer to the firm.
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(a) Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).






















(b) Illustration of W (s̃) =W (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).
Figure 4.1: Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)), and W (s̃). Parameter values are α = 0.5, µ =
0.02, r = 0.1, σ = 0.01, η = 0.05, δ = 10.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the first-best, second-best outcome and the firm’s optimal in-
vestment threshold X∗(s̃) and investment capacity K∗(s̃). It is shown that without subsidy,
i.e., s̃ = 0, the firm invests at the social optimal threshold X∗(0) = X∗W with half of the
social optimal capacity K∗(0) = K∗W/2. The half capacity result can be derived by com-
paring solutions for quadratic equations (4.7) and (4.10). For the given parameter values,
K∗(0) = 4.385 and K∗W = 8.770. This is consistent with the findings by Huisman and Kort
(2015). Figure 4.1a also shows that as s̃ increases, the firm’s optimal investment decision
(X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)) deviates further from the first-best outcome. Moreover, the two subsidy
flows s̃p(X(t),K)K and s̃K have similar influence on firm’s investment decision. We can
see this from the overlap of the two curves2 for (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)). Besides, the two subsidy
flows have the same second-best outcome (X∗(s̃∗),K∗(s̃∗)) as shown in Figure 4.1a. This is
due to the fact that W (s̃) has the same expression for the two unconditional subsidy flows.
However, the second-best outcome is generated by different subsidy rates as illustrated by
Figure 4.1b. The subsidy rate is s̃∗ = 0.113 for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and s̃∗ = 0.102
for flow s̃K. Figure 4.1b also illustrates the discounted total surplus generated by the firm’s
optimal investment decision. Under unconditional subsidy, the social surplus generated by
the firm’s investment decision is always below the social optimal surplus, implying that
unconditional subsidy cannot lead to social optimum. Figure 4.1b shows that as the sub-
sidy rate goes up, the social surplus first increases and then decreases. Because, the social
surplus W (s̃) consists of producer surplus, consumer surplus and subsidy costs, we further
analyze this by the illustration of Figure 4.2.











V (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃), s̃) and the discounted subsidy
2We didn’t plot (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)) that generates negative W ∗(s̃).
134 Chapter 4. Subsidized Capacity Investment under Uncertainty

















(a) Subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K.

















(b) Subsidy flow s̃K.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of CS(s̃), PS(s̃) and C(s̃). Parameter values are α = 0.5, µ = 0.02,






C(s̃) to a predetermined time X∗(0). Note that for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,











For subsidy flow s̃K, the expected subsidy cost is s̃K∗(s̃)/r. Figure 4.2 shows that the
discounted consumer surplus, producer surplus and subsidy costs increase with uncondi-
tional subsidy rate s̃, despite the fact that s̃ > 0 makes the firm invest earlier and less. It
is intuitive that the discounted producer surplus increases with the subsidy rate. This is
because for two subsidy rates s̃1 > s̃2 ≥ 0, the firm can always choose investment decision
(X∗(s̃2),K∗(s̃2)) for subsidy rate s̃1, which would yield a producer surplus that is equal
to PS(X∗(s̃2),K∗(s̃2))+ s̃1 p(X∗(s̃2),K∗(s̃2))K∗(s̃2). The fact that the firm chooses invest-
ment decision (X∗(s̃1),K∗(s̃1)) implies it generates larger producer surplus. The consumer
surplus also increases with s̃ because though the firm’s output decreases with a larger s̃,
the firm starts production earlier. So the consumption also starts earlier, which is preferred
by the consumers and yields a larger consumer surplus. The discounted subsidy cost also
increases with s̃. This is intuitive because otherwise the government should provide an in-
finite subsidy rate given that both producer and consumer surpluses increase with s̃. When
s̃ is small, the subsidy cost grows slower than the sum of producer and consumer surplus.
This is illustrated by an increasing total surplus in Figure 4.1b. As s̃ increases, the subsidy
cost increases faster than the sum of consumer and producer surplus. This leads to the
decrease of total surplus in Figure 4.1b.
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4.3.4 Optimal conditional subsidy
Though unconditional subsidy does not yield the first-best outcome, it is still possible to
align firm’s optimal investment decision to the social optimal decision through a condi-
tional subsidy, that is, the subsidy implemented at a specific Brownian motion level. This
is due to the same investment threshold of the firm and social planner without subsidy reg-
ulation, X∗W = X
∗(0). We take that as one decision variable already being aligned. Then it
is only necessary to align the investment capacities by choosing the subsidy rate parameter.
The optimal conditional subsidy regulation is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. The optimal conditional subsidy is to introduce subsidy at the social op-







for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
rX∗W−r(r−µ)δ
r−µ for subsidy flow s̃K,
X∗W−(r−µ)δ
δ (r−µ) for lump sum subsidy s̃K.
The optimal conditional subsidy described in this proposition aligns firm’s and social
planner’s investment decision, and generates the first-best outcome. Because there is no
asymmetry of information on investment costs, according to Broer and Zwart (2013), a
conditional subsidy described in Proposition 4.4 can be interpreted simply as the regulator
tells the monopolist when to invest and how much to invest. The changes in market param-
eters influence the dynamic optimal subsidy rates, and the influence is summarized in the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. When the volatility rate σ or drift parameter µ increases, the firm needs to
be subsidized more in order to invest at the social optimal capacity level.
This is because an increase in σ or µ makes the social planner invest later and more.
In order for the firm to catch up with the social optimal capacity, either to prepare for
positive future demand shocks because of larger σ or to satisfy a larger anticipated future
market demand growth because of larger market trend µ , more monetary support needs to
be transferred to the firm.
4.4 Non-linear Demand
From previous section, it is now clear that with linear inverse demand function, uncon-
ditional subsidy support does not align firm and social planner’s investment decision. A
possible reason might be the linear demand shocks. In this section, we study nonlinear
demand shocks and check the performance of the same subsidy regulations in previous
136 Chapter 4. Subsidized Capacity Investment under Uncertainty
section. Suppose
p(t) = X(t)K(t)−γ
with 0 < γ < 1, and X(t) follows geometric Brownian motion of (4.1). Investment costs
are of the form3 δ0 + δ1K(t) with δ0 ≥ 0 and δ1 > 0. In the following analysis, we first
discuss the first-best outcome and then check whether unconditional subsidy makes the
monopolist deviate or converge to the social optimal investment. Later we focus on the
optimal subsidy regulation policy.
4.4.1 First-best benchmark
The producer surplus equals to the value of investment, i.e., expected discounted profit
flows after investment minus investment costs. For a given investment capacity K and
geometric Brownian motion level X(0) = X , the producer surplus at X is given by
PS(X ,K) =V (X ,K) =
XK1−γ
r−µ −δ0−δ1K.
For a given level of K, the producer surplus increases with X . The reason is that for a
given output K, a larger X implies larger market demand and higher market prices, which
makes the firm more profitable and thus generates larger producer surplus. Given the firm





























The insight for consumer surplus is the same as that under linear demand. For a given X ,
the consumer surplus increases with K because more output decreases market prices. For
a given K, the consumer surplus increases with X because consumer’s willingness to pay
increases. The expected social surplus is the sum of producer and consumer surplus and is
3We take a different cost structure than the linear demand because of two reasons. First reason is that
the cost structure δK does not yield any solution for firm’s investment decision under non-linear demand.
Second reason is that the cost structure δ0 + δ1K does not change the main results obtained under linear
demand.
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given by





From the social welfare function, we can derive the social optimal investment decision as
the first-best benchmark. It is summarized in the following proposition.






and the social optimal investment capacity is




A further analysis on the influence of market volatility yields similar insight as that un-
der linear market demand structure. Because ∂β/∂σ < 0, ∂X∗W/∂β < 0, and ∂K∗W/∂β < 0,
it can be concluded that ∂X∗W/∂σ > 0 and ∂K∗W/∂σ > 0, implying a non-linear demand
structure like the iso-elastic demand does not change the standard real option result that a
greater volatility delays investment and leads to installing a larger project.
4.4.2 Subsidized Profit Maximization Investment
In this subsection, subsidy flows s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K and s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K are
considered. The lump sum subsidy transfer s(K, s̃) = s̃(δ0 + δ1K) is analyzed in more
detail than that under the linear demand structure because of the fixed cost, δ0, from invest-
ment. This makes it behave a little differently from the subsidy flow s̃K. The focus of the
analysis is on how subsidy influences firm’s investment decision. Moreover, it compares
the influence of subsidy under non-linear demand with the influence under linear demand.
Proposition 4.6. When subsidy flow is s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃p(X(t),K)K, firm’s optimal invest-













When subsidy flow is s(X(t),K, s̃) = s̃K and s̃ < rδ1, firm’s optimal investment threshold
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When the lump sum subsidy transfer is s(K, s̃) = s̃(δ0 + δ1K), firm’s optimal investment













By comparing (X∗W ,K
∗
W ) with (X
∗(0),K∗(0)), we find that without subsidy regulation,
the firm invests later than the social planner but with the social optimal capacity. This is
different from the linear demand structure, where the firm invests at the same time as the
social planner but with half of the social optimal capacity when s̃ = 0. For unconditional
subsidy, Proposition 4.6 shows that subsidy makes the firm invest earlier, the same as the
linear demand structure. Another insight of the three subsidy regulations is that subsidy
flow s̃K influences the firm’s optimal investment capacity, but subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K
and lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K) do not. This is different from that under linear demand
structure, where all the three subsidy regulations make firm invest less.
For the unconditional subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K),
because X∗(0)> X∗W and subsidy regulation makes firm invest earlier than trigger X
∗(0), it
is possible to align firm’s and social optimal investment threshold by choosing appropriate
subsidy rate s̃. This implies that unconditional subsidy can reach the first-best outcome for
subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K). Whereas for subsidy flow
s̃K, unconditional subsidy not only makes the firm invest earlier but also makes the firm
invest with a capacity that is larger than the social optimal capacity. This implies that the
first-best outcome cannot be reached for unconditional subsidy flow s̃K. But a conditional
subsidy flow s̃K can achieve the first-best outcome. This is because subsidy motivates the
firm to invest earlier than X∗(0), a conditional subsidy can be implemented such that the
firm invests at X∗W with K
∗
W for subsidy flow s̃K. In fact, the optimal conditional subsidy
can be implemented for all the three, the same as under the linear demand structure. We
summarize the optimal unconditional and conditional subsidy regulations in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.7. Unconditional subsidy regulation implemented at X(0) is optimal for
subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump sum subsidy transfer s̃(δ0 + δ1K) if the subsidy rate
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1−γ for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
γ for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K).








1−γ for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
rγδ1 for subsidy flow s̃K,
γ for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K).
With the optimal subsidy regulation, the firm’s investment decision is aligned to the so-
cial optimal decision and leads to the first-best outcome. This result is the same as under
the linear demand structure. Recall from the previous section that for unconditional sub-
sidy, the second-best outcome is to implement no subsidy at all. In the following analysis,
we check whether this is also true for iso-elastic demand structure. Note that unconditional
subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 + δ1K) can achieve the first-best
outcome. So our focus is on the unconditional subsidy flow s̃K.













(a) Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).




















(b) Illustration of W (s̃) =W (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)).
Figure 4.3: Illustration of (X∗(s̃),K∗(s̃)), and W ∗(s̃) for subsidy flow s̃K. Parameter values
are µ = 0.02, r = 0.1, σ = 0.01, γ = 0.5, δ0 = 2, δ1 = 10.
Figure 4.3a demonstrates the firm’s optimal investment capacity K∗(s̃) and optimal
investment threshold X∗(s̃) as functions of subsidy rate s̃. It is clear that when s̃ = 0,
K∗(0) = K∗W . As s̃ increases, K
∗(s̃) deviates from social optimal K∗W , but X
∗(s̃) is get-
ting close to X∗W . Figure 4.3b shows the total surplus, discounted to a predetermined time
X∗(0), as a function of unconditional subsidy rate. As illustrated, there exists a subsidy rate
that generates the highest level of social welfare for unconditional subsidy. The subsidy
rate that generates the second-best outcome is s̃ = 0.455. As shown in Figure 4.3b, the
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total surplus for the second-best outcome is below the social optimal welfare that is also
discounted to X∗(0). This result is similar to that under linear demand structure for the
unconditional subsidy regulation.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes investment decision of a profit maximizer under subsidy regulation
and how to align this decision to social optimal decision through optimal subsidy. We
show that unconditional subsidy introduced from the beginning accelerates the investment
of a monopoly firm. Under linear demand structure, unconditional subsidy regulation can-
not align the profit and welfare maximizers’ investment decisions. Moreover, it decreases
monopolist’s optimal investment capacity and results in smaller social surplus. There is
conditional subsidy regulation that aligns the firm’s investment decision to the social opti-
mal decision. This optimal conditional subsidy requires to introduce subsidy at the social
optimal investment threshold. For non-linear iso-elastic demand, depending on the form
of subsidy regulations, it is possible to implement unconditional subsidy to align profit
maximizing and social optimal investment decisions. The conditional subsidy can also
be implemented in a similar way as under linear demand structure. If we dismiss the ef-
ficiency loss when collecting and allocating the taxation, the aligned profit maximizer’s
investment decision can lead to the first-best outcome for both the linear and non-linear
market demand.
4.6 Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of the propositions for the linear and iso-elastic demand
functions.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 The social optimal investment capacity KW (X) maximizes W (X ,K)
and is equal to
KW (X) =
rX− r(r−µ)δ
η [(r−µ)α + r(1−α)X ] , (4.12)
which is equivalent to
X =
(r−µ)(rδ +αηKW (X))
r (1− (1−α)ηKW (X))
.
Let the option value before social planner’s investment be AW Xβ . The value matching and
smooth pasting at the social optimal investment threshold X∗W yield
W (X∗W ,KW (X
∗
















(2− (1−α)ηKW (X∗W ))−
αηKW (X∗W )
r
−2δ = 0. (4.13)
Combining (4.12) and (4.6), we get the social optimal investment capacity K∗W satisfies the
following implicit equation
α(1−α)η2K2 + rδ (β +1)(1−α)ηK +α(β −2)ηK−2rδ = 0. (4.14)
Proof of Proposition 4.2 For X(0) = X , the optimal investment capacity K(X , s̃) maxi-












K(X , s̃) =
r(1+ s̃)X− r(r−µ)δ
2η(1+ s̃)[(r−µ)α + r(1−α)X ] . (4.15)
Let the option value before investment be AXβ , β > 2 from assumptions in the model of
additive demand function. From the value matching and smooth pasting at the optimal
investment threshold X∗, then
V (X∗,K(X∗, s̃), s̃) = AX∗β ,
















Solving (4.15) and (4.16) yields that the optimal investment capacity K∗(s̃) satisfies the




(β +1)(1−α)ηK +α(β −2)ηK− rδ
1+ s̃
= 0. (4.17)




4α(1−α)η2K∗+ rx(β +1)(1−α)η +α(β −2)
)
= r (1− (β +1)(1−α)ηK∗) .
This implies that dK∗/dx > 0, i.e., dK∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0. So the subsidy in the market motivates
the firm to invest less. Moreover, from (4.15), the profit maximizer’s optimal investment















This yields that dX∗/dx > 0, i.e., dX∗(s̃)/ds̃ < 0. The subsidy also makes the profit maxi-
mizer invest earlier.
Proof of Proposition 4.3 For a given capacity K and X(0) = X , the value for the expected
discounted profit flow is















The optimal capacity for a given X and s̃ maximizes the value of the firm and is given by
K(X , s̃) =
rX +(r−µ)s̃− r(r−µ)δ
2η [(r−µ)α + r(1−α)X ] .
For a given capacity size K, by value matching and smooth pasting at the investment thresh-






Combining K(X , s̃) and X(K, s̃), we get that the optimal investment capacity K∗(s̃) satisfies
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the implicit expression
2α(1−α)η2K2 +(β +1)(1−α)(rδ − s̃)ηK +α(β −2)ηK− (rδ − s̃) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.4 For subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K and s̃K, the optimal subsidy rate
can be derived by letting KW (XW ) = K(XW , s̃). For lump sum subsidy, the optimal subsidy
rate is equal to s̃∗/(rδ ) given s̃∗ as the optimal subsidy rate for the flow s̃K.
Proof of Corollary 4.2 Larger σ leads to larger s̃∗ because of ∂X∗W/∂σ > 0 and ∂ s̃∗/∂X∗W >
0. Thus, it holds that the optimal conditional subsidy rate s̃∗ increases with σ . Next, we
check the influence of µ on s̃∗. Recall from previous analysis that ∂X∗W/∂ µ > 0. Then
for the three optimal conditional subsidy rates, we can get the following first order partial






























for lump sum s̃K.
It can be concluded that ∂ s̃∗/∂ µ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.5 For given X , the investment capacity that maximizes social wel-







Let the social planner’s value before investment be AXβ , then according to value matching
























The corresponding investment capacity is given by
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= − δ0(1− γ)
δ1(βγ−1)2
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.6 For a given capacity size K and X(0) = X , the value of the
expected discounted profit flow at X is equal to









r −δ0−δ1K for subsidy flow s̃K,
XK1−γ
r−µ − (1− s̃)(δ0 +δ1K) for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K).




















for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K).
Substituting K(X) into V (X ,K) gives the expected value as a function of X , i.e., V (X). Let
the value before investment threshold X∗ be AXβ . Then the value matching and smooth

























for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K).
From the optimal investment threshold X∗(s̃), we can get that the optimal investment ca-
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δ1(βγ−1) for subsidy flow s̃p(X(t),K)K,
δ0β (1−γ)
(δ1−s̃/r)(βγ−1) for subsidy flow s̃K,
δ0β (1−γ)
δ1(βγ−1) for lump sum subsidy s̃(δ0 +δ1K).
Proof of Proposition 4.7 Given in the text.
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